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CHAPTER I 
DfTRODUCTIOM 
Collective bargaining, while solving most of the disputes which arise 
in union-management contract negotiations, leaves many differences over 
working conditions in doubt. These differences may arise from an ambigu-
ous contract containing few, if any, references to subcontracting. And 
such differences in opinion may become major grievances. 
The scope of collective bargaining has been broadened to include 
under "working conditions" many new areas, among them subcontracting. 
The increased scope and complexity of collective bargaining have brought 
about the need for an instrument to preserve industrial peace. This need 
has been partially met by the voluntary submiss~on of grievances to arbi-
tration. Individual arbitrators are selected to decide whether the ob-
jecting party has a legitimate claim based upon the contract language (or 
contractual intent). They must also determine if management has, or has 
not, through negotiations contractually reduced its unilateral authority 
in a particular area. 
Subcontracting has in recent years become one of the most contro-
versial areas of disputes; therefore, the title of this thesis is, "The 
Effects of Arbitrators' Decisions in Subcontracting Cases Upon Management 
Rights." 
Problem 
Most labor contracts cover the bargaining unit employees and not the 
operations of the firm. In the absence of specific contractual language, 
1 
2 
employers maintain it is their function to operate the business efficient-
ly with the most economical factors available. Historically, managemeut 
has made unilateral decisions within this realm. 
On the other hand the job security of the individual union member 
and of the bargainins unit as a whole dictates that grievances be filed 
whenever subcontracting is suspected to be in violation of the meaning and/ 
or intent of the contract. Legitimate functions of both labor and manage-
ment may be involved within the grievance. And if an extreme position is 
taken and insisted upon by either party to the contract, a situation can 
develop where industrial peace will be difficult to achieve. 
This thesis addresses itself to one phase of this broad problem, 
i.e., the effect of arbitrators' recognition of implied limitations upon 
management's right to subcontract. 
Methodology 
To establish a basis for the understanding of the issues involved and 
to deteraine the pertinent factors, the following methods were used: 
1. A review of the literature since 1945 was made. This review 
sought to determine if there bad been any change in the view of either 
management, labor, arbitrators, or labor economists concerning management 
rights in general, and subcontracting in particular. Previous studies on 
subcontracting arbitration were also examined. 
2. The question of arbitrability of subcontracting was examined 
next. Is this a management prerogative that is not affected by the arbi-
tration clause? The 29 relevant decisions by the courts and the nineteen 
decisions by arbitrators in the Labor Arbitration Reports (Volumes 1-37) 
were exaained to deteraine important criteria, opinions, and any dis -
tinsuishable trend . 
3 
3. The determinants of the outcome of the arbitration of subcon-
tracting cases were examined next. There were 181 relevant subcontracting 
grievances examined. These cases were classified into types of work in-
volved, and factors that influence the determination of (a) violations of 
the contract, and (b) acceptable actions by management. These determi-
nants were analyzed by time periods to distinguish trends in arbitrators' 
awards. 
Terminology 
Certain terminology utilized within this thesis warrants explicit 
definition: 
Subcontracting. In its common meaning, subcontracting is simply a 
practice of letting a contract, under, or subordinate to, a previous 
contract. From labor's point of view, subcontracting is the practice of 
transferring work (production or service) or the opportunity to work from 
the bargaining unit to other workers. These new workers may belong to a 
union or be non-union workers. The work may be on or off the plant 
premises. Some cases reported in the Labor Arbitration Reports include 
work performed by another plant of the same company or one of its subsidi-
aries. Subcontracting is listed in the Labor Arbitration Reports under 
sub-titles 2.137, 117,38, and 117.381. 1 
Management Rights. This managerial authority is called by many 
names, e.g., prerogative, function, privilege. Fundamentally, these re-
fer to the protection of control and authority that management wishes to 
retain in the operation of the business. 
Arbitration. Labor arbitration refers to the settlement of proper 
1see pages five and six for limitations. 
4 
grievances by an approved third party. In most contracts there is a volun-
tary submission to the arbitrator of the issues in dispute. The decision 
of the arbitrator is compulsory upon the parties. After an analysis of the 
pertinent factors, the arbitrator gives his award. This award is a com-
pulsory settlement--voluntary labor arbitration decisions are final and 
binding upon the parties. The arbitrator's duty is to interpret the con-
2 tractual language to determine if the grievance is valid. 
Management Rights Clause. 3 This is a statement in the contract at-
testing to certain· basic rights or functions which management explicitly 
4 does not surrender. Generally, a statement is included that indicates 
that tbe stated functions are not all-inclusive. Also, commqnly included 
is a statement to the effect that this clause does not negate other clauses 
in the contract. 
5 Arbitration Clause. These contracts have a clause which indicates 
that all queations of interpretation or application of the contract, which 
cannot be settled through the grievance precedure, will be referred to an 
arbitrator for a final and binding decision. Definite procedures are 
' 
followed from the initial grievance to the selection of the iapartial third 
party and his award. 
Arbitrability. This involves the question of whether the parties in-
tended to submit to arbitration the specific dispute. The arbitrability 
of subcontracting is an illustration of this type of dispute. If the 
2see Chapter Three for opinions on this topic. 
3Each clause is a separate entity and no attempt will be made to in-
clude all the terminology used in these clauses. This is only an indica-
tion of a general model. 
4
see .Appendix A for an example. 
s See Chapter Three for opinions on this topic. 
5 
contract give, the arbitrator jurisdiction, either explicitly or iaplied6 
through the contractual language then the grievance can be taken through 
the arbitration procedure. 
Limitations 
This study was limited to the rights of management to subcontract 
which are not restricted by law or govermaental regulation. Illegal co-
' 
ercive action by a union to limit, or management . to initiate subcontracting 
was not studied. 7 Compulsory arbitration was not considered, nor arbi-
tration that is not: (1) agreed to in advance by the parties, (2) in-
volved within the grievance procedure, (3) or otherwise jointly agreed 
upon. Further excluded was arbitration that did not include interpreta-
tion of the meaning and intent of the terms and provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 
Suits to compel arbitration under Section 301 (A) and (B) of the Taft-
Bartley Act were a proper subject of consideration, if directly related 
to the above-mentioned subcontracting. 8 
Subcontracting in the Labor Arbitration Reports include case listings 
from the titles 2.137 and 117.38. This includes those cases from Volume 
l through Volume 30. From Volume 31 through Volume 37, the title for sub-
contracting is listed under 117.381. 
The arbitrability of subcontracting grievances has been listed under 
94.101, 94.~03, and 94.117 from Voluae l through Volume 30. Volumes 31, 
6 See Chapter Three. 
7 For a discussion of this see: Ralph Slovenko, ed., Symposium .2!l 
LMllDA: Ih!, I.,abor-Manageaent Report ~ Disclosure ~ of .!2l!, (Baton 
Rouge, 1961), pp. 793-925. 
8.rhe appropriate parts of Section 301 are included in Appendix B. 
6 
through 37 list such titles under 94.166. 
These cases for both subcontracting and the arbitrability of sub-
contracting cover th~ period from 1945 to 1962. (Labor Arbitration Re-
ports, Volumes 1 through Volume 37.) 
Cases listed under these titles that are not applicable to the study 
of subcontracting were not considered. Exclusions are: Contract negoti-
ations before an arbitration board, grievances that are referred back to 
the parties for further negotiations, decisions by either arbitrators or 
courts that are appealed,9 damages sought by either party from present or 
pri_or awards, and case listings under 94.166 not directly related to sub-
contracting awards. 
Basically, arbitrators' opinions were studied; however, in certain 
cases judicial opinions were studied to determine arbitrability of sub-
contracting disputes. When arbitrability had been determined, then arbi-
trators' opinions concerning precedents, trends, peculiarities, and gener-
al characteristics were examined in detail. 
!!!!, of Presentation 
Chapter II is devoted to a review of the literature concerning labor-
management concepts of management rights and the issue of subcontracting. 
An analysis of the determination of arbitrability is presented in Chapter 
III. Chapter Ill also includes a discussion of the Warrior and§.!!.!! de-
cision by the Supreme Court. An analysis of the Labor Arbitration Reports 
to determine the views of arbitrators is presented in Chapter IV. Chapter 
9Bowe~er see pages 26-34 for a discussion of decisions leading up to, 
and including, the United States Supreae Court decision in United Steel-
workers 2!.America versus Warrior~~ Navigation Company. 
7 
IV also includes the determinants of subcontracting arbitration and a 
classification by types of work subcontracted. A detailed analysis of 
the determinants of subcontfacting arbitration by time period is included 
in Chapter V. Special attention was given to the importance of implied 
restrictions upon management's right to subcontract in Chapter V. A sum-
mary statement of the effect of arbitrators' decisions in subcontracting 
cases upon managementrights is made in the final chapter (Chapter VI). 
CHAPrBB. II 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERA'ruRE 
The expanding scope of collective bargaining bas create~ difficulties 
over management rights. T~e rights or prerogatives issues strike at the 
heart of labor•management functions (job security-versus-direction of the 
working force or management of the business.) 
This chapter will be devoted to a survey of selected literature on 
management rights and subcontracting arbitration. Rave management ·and 
labor leaders changed their viewpoints on unilateral managerial actions? 
What are the opinions of arbitrators and other labor·management authori-
ties on managerial subcontracting? The first section of this chapter con-
tains a statement of two basic theories concerning management rights. 
The second section is an examination of previous and current thought on 
arbitration. The third section is devoted to statistical studies on sub~ 
contracting . The fourth section ia devoted to the criteria used in de• 
termining the propriety of subcontracting. The fifth section deals with 
changes in the viewpoints of arbitrators. 
I!!!. Basic Theories 
Kost managerial authorities list two main areas of thought con-
cerning management rights . The residual theory developed before unions 
began limiting management's rights to unilateral action. This theory 
maintained that most powers, whether they be termed functions, prerogatives, 
8 
9 
or rights are retained by manageaent. 1 However, with the advent of the 
large industrial union these powers were liaited. Formal contracts re-
stricted unilateral actions of managtl'lllent. The theory currently assumes 
that management has incurred through collective bargaining certain ape-
cific restrictions upon its rights. 
Ma~agement does not, however, surrender any rights or privileges 
: •. that have not been specifically negotiated away in the collective bargaining 
process. Most believers in the residual theory prefer strict enforcement 
of all the requirements built into the contract. This legalistic attitude 
often creates an .atmosphere which is not conducive to iadustrial peace. 
The more modeni, though not necessarily the most popular, theory is 
the trusteeship theory which emphasizes the different obligations of 
management. 2 The principal obligation of management is to operate the 
firm ia the most efficient manner possible, so as to maximize profits 
which accrue to the stockholders. But management's responsibility does 
not end at this point. Management has a responsibility to labor in the 
provision of jobs, and a responsibility to the consumer for the product 
he buys. And management has certain obligations to the colllllUnity in which 
it operates. Therefore management's responsibilities are fourfold. Many 
believe that these responsibilities can best be served by union-management 
agreements. This theory (trusteeship) takes the position that collective 
bargaining does not restrict the functions of management. The question 
of exclusive subjects is not the focus of the problem, but rather, manage-
ment's proper function is focused upon administration, and upon its 
1t.ae H. Hill and Charles R. Hook, Jr., Management!! the Bargaining 
Table (Rew York, 1945), pp. 56-60. 
2Rarold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining (Englewood 
Cliffs, 1959), p. 161. 
10 
fourfold responsibilities. 
Previous and Current Thought 2!!. Arbitration !!!!_ Management Rights 
President's Labor-Manageaent Conference 2,! 1?45. One of the firat 
attempts to deal with differences of opinion concerning management's 
right to manage was the President's Labor-Nanageaent Conference in No• 
vember, 1945'. 3 
The co ... ittee on Manageaent's Right to Manage was asked to consider: 
The extent to which industrial disputes can be mini-
mized by full and genuine acceptance by organized labor of. 
the inherent rights and responsibilities of management to 
direct the operation of an enterprise.4 
The manage•nt membem of the co ... ittee on Management's Right to 
Manage proposed certain exclusive management functions. A summary of 
these functions includes: 
Determination of products; lay-out and equipment; fi-
nancial policies; management organization of each producing 
or distributing unit; job content; and safety, health, and 
property protection measures where legal responsibility of 
the employer is involved.5 
The labor aembers did not specifically take a negative attitude 
toward these functions, but instead preferred a flexible approach. These 
members said that: 
It would be extreaely unwise to build a fenca around the 
rights and responsibilities of management on the one hand and 
the union on the other. The experience of many years shows 
that with the growth of mutual understanding the responsibil-
ities of one of the parties today may well become the joint 
responsibility of both parties tomorrav.6 
3united States Department of Labor, Ih!. President's Bational Labor-
Management Conference: 1945. Bulletin No. 77 (Washington. u. s. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1946). 
4 Ibid., P• 57. 
51bid., p. 58. 
6lbid., P• 61. 
Industrial Relations Research Association (First Annual Meeting). 
Su-er H. Slichter was chairman of the session entitled, "Collective 
Bargaining and Management Rights."7 
Father Brown contrasted the views of labor and management. In hia 
opinion labor did not want to share in the functional responsibility of 
management. But labor in pursuing its desires was interested in expan• 
11 
sion of the area of collective bargaining. Management on the other hand 
wished to retain its authority. Management based its authority upon 
legal and historical grounds, and took the position that the direction 
and contro,l of business can best be maintained by the preservation of 
management rights. 
Douglas Brown indicated that there are many differing views con-
earning collective bargaining. From these views he developed three as 
r•presentative of this area of thought on collective bargaining agree-
ments. · 
One view is that management retains all the powers or rights which 
have not been specifically restricted by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.8 Therefore, the union would not obtain any control over the dis-
cretion of management to use its judgment (act unilaterally) except for 
the definite restrictions that were made during the contract negotiations. 
The residual rights of management at common law could further be liaited 
only by statutes. 
The second view (at the other extreme) maintains that the recognition 
clause or any similar contract language limits unilateral changes by 
management. No change would be allowed concerning the wages, hours, and 
7 Industrial Relations Research Association, Proceedings of First 
Annual Meeting (Madison, Wisconsin, 1949), pp. 132-170. 
8Bill and Hook, p. 74. 
12 
workiag conditions upon which labor and management had agreed. If a change 
ia desired, the bargaining process must be used. Consultation with the 
union would be necessary before any action could be taken by management 
on a non-negotiated subject. 
The preceding views were rejected by Mr. Brown as impractical. 
The third and the most practical view was expressed by Mr. Brawn as 
one in which "modes of procedure09 or past practices are the criteria for 
unilateral actions. Management can unilaterally exercise those rights 
which it has customarily exerci,sed in the past. Though the collective 
bargaining agreement has been reached, the limitations upon management 
are only pertinent to those courses of action which have not been used 
before. Conditions of employment not specifically referred to are assumed 
to follow the pre-existing patterns (modes of procedure). 
Messrs. Saugee and Tannenbaum substantially agreed with Mr. Brown's 
third view. Mr. French, of the Rational Association of Manufacturers 
agreed with the third view on most points; however, he would reserve 
certain functions of authorit~ and responsibility to managerial dis-
cretion. 
Charles Wiedeman of the International Association of Machinists 
sumaarized these papers from the labor point of view. He was critical 
of the adherence by some to definite prerogatilYes of management in 
certain subjects on conditions of employment. Be referred to the histori-
cal "divine rightstt of management as being ·subconsciously referred to by 
the discussants. He fel t','. that management should: 
••• withdraw into a .. nagerial capacity, concerned only with 
sales, distribution, and technological processes. Let labor 
91ndustrial Relations Research Association, p. 148. 
through its collective agencies handle problems dealing 
with the hum.an and social aspects of our economy.10 
National Academy 2!,Arbitrators (Binth Annual Meeting). "Naaage-
aent's Reserved Rights: An Industry View" was delivered by James C. 
Phelps. 11 Mr. Phelps referred to management rights as "the residue of 
' 
13 
management's pre-exiating functions which remains after the negotiation 
of a collective bargaining agreement."12 But, he pointed out, arbitrators 
and other interested parties have not been consistent in their approach to 
the question of managerial initiative after the signing of a collective 
bargaining agreement. (The views expresaed by these parties are similar 
to those on pages 11 and 12 of this thesis.) 
Mr. Phelps pointed out that arbitrators generally, and certainly 
management, follow the view that management retains the same right it had 
before collective bargaining, except for the specific restrictions imposed 
by the contract. But some arbitrators do not follow this principle, and 
even those who do only partially use the principle in practice. An analy-
sis and interpretation of the existing contract are necessary, but the 
arbitrator should refrain from stating what he thinks should be in the 
contract. 
The Management Rights Clause has value because it offers written 
evidence both to arbitrators, vh~ can cite the specific language in de-
' 
cisions, and shop supervisors, who aust apply the written contract at the 
production level. Mr. Phelps indicated that it should be unnecessary to 
include a statement in the Management Rights Clause that management is not 
lOlbid., pp. 169-170. 
llNational Academy of Arbitrators, Management's Right .!!!,g_~-
tration Process, (Proceedings of Ninth Annual Meeting) (Washington: 
1956), pp. 102-117. 
l21bid., p. 105. 
14 
obligated to any further degree thaa that specified within the contract. 
In summary, Mr. Phelp• indicated that management's function is to 
manage the business • He said : .  
To read into the mere act of signina a contract iaplicationa 
that may never have been conaidered by either party is repugnant 
to the basic concept of the colle(:tive bargaining agreement that 
it is a voluntary act of the parties. To the extent that the 
parties have not aeen fit to limit management's sphere of action, 
management's riahts are unimparied by the contract.13 
Arthur J. Goldberg, then general counsel for the United Steelworkers 
of AMrica, discussed "Hanag•ent's Reserved Rights: A Labor View."14 
Mr. Goldberg indicated that management's traditional view of its rights 
often is not Yalid. Labor alao has many rights and customs which ahould 
not be ignored, and neither party can produce without the other. When 
the collective bargaining contract is agreed to in writing, it represents 
a mutual agreement · by both parties for the benefit of both. The agree-
ment is not an attempt to impose the will of one party upon another. 
Labor recognizes that someone must be the manager. But labor has the 
right to grieve when management unilaterally acts in the supervision of 
the working force. Mr. Goldberg said: 
It is essential that arbitrators not give greater weight 
to the directing force than the objecting forcel5 ••• After 
they LmanageMnt and labor/ have come to terms, we cannot now 
assume that somehow one pirty to the deal brings into it a 
backlog of rights and powers it enjoyed in dealing with indi-
vidual employeeal6 •••• To suggest that management can make 
change• at will unless the contract specifically bars it ia 
unfair and can lead to placing so many bars in the contract 
as to make successful negotiating increasingly difficult and 
13Ibid., p. 117. 
14Ibid., PP• 118-129. 
15 121. Ibid., p. 
16Ibid., P• 125. 
operations less and less flexible, with detailed considera-
tion of the facts and aerits of each case replaced by pre-
cise rules and regulations.17 
15 
Sidney A. Wolff indicated that the area of management rights is one 
of the most troublesome areas. 18 Mr . Wolff tends to agree that manage-
19 
ment retains all of its "normal aud customary rights." "Good faith" 20 
should be characteristic of all managerial action. "Just cause1121 and 
reasonableness are other criteria for the evaluation of the actions of 
management. The recoguition clause does not limit the right of action 
as might be inferred by some arbitrators. An inadequate Management 
Rights Clause may provide a situation where managerial functions could 
be reduced. 22 
Mr. Wolff believes that Mr. Goldberg's liaitation on management 
rights to ouly those rights established in the contract is an extreae 
position. He concluded that positions of both labor and manage .. nt ap-
pear to be extreme at times.23 
Neil W. Chamberlain developed several interestiug aspects of the re-
served rights question.24 Be disagreed with Mr. Goldberg's contention 
that labor grievauce and management action should be giveu equal signifi-
cance. Basing this view on the organizational way of life, Mr. Chamberlain 
171bid. • P• 126. 
181bid. • P • 129. 
191bid., p. 130. 
201bid., P• 134. 
211bid., P• 133. 
22see Appendix A for what Mr. Wolff considers an adequate clause. 
23Management Rights !!!_!l £h!. Arbitration Process, p. 138. 
24Also see Neil W. Chamberlain, The Union Challenge~ Management 
Control (Rew York, 1948). 
indicated that the aanagerial action, if reasonable and in good faith, 
should be upheld. He said. 
Manage .. nt requires initiative, and initiative requires 
discretion and the exercise of judgaeat, and if that judgaent 
is exercised fairly, it should be upheld even though the 
union-equally fairly--would have it otherwise.25 
Mr. Chamberlain agrees with Mr. Wolff that Mr. Goldberg's approach 
to using practices that have developed contractually between the em-
ployer and the union to the exclusion of any other managerial action is 
16 
not acceptable. The philosophy behind our enterprise and legal system 
would tend to preclude such a relationship. "The right of initiative11 26 
belongs to those managements which act in good faith and with reason. 
Mr. Goldberg's arguaent concerning the whole agreement was tera8d"appro-
priate. 11 There should be, accordiag to Mr. Chamberlain, the understanding 
that collective agreements involve both explicit and iaplied obligations 
of mutual responsibility. Therefore, an arbitrator would be correct if 
be interprets the contract according to the implications of the explicit 
clauses. The recognition clause iaplied greater importance than just the 
recognition of the union. He concludes: 
I would maintain that recognition of the union-the col-
lective bargaining process itself-binds management to prior 
consultation and negotiation with the union on a certain 
genera~ly understood range of subject matter and imposes on 
it the obligation of seeking agreement in these areas during 
the lifetime of the agreement, even though it does not de-
prive management of the power of action, failing an agreement 
which it is in its interest to secure.27 
In his paper, "Arbitrability and the Arbitration Process," Jules J. 
Jqstin develops the functional relations between arbitration and the 
25Managements Rights and !h!, Arbitration Process, p. 140. 
( 
261bid., p . 141. 
271bid., p. 148. 
17 
arbitrator. 28 Mr. Justin identifies the function of an arbitrator as the 
dµty to determine the issues of a dispute oaly on matters involved within 
the contract. If the contract does not give an arbitrator the appro-
priate jurisdiction, the dispute is not arbitrable, i.e., the arbitrator 
cannot determine the merits of the dispute. When a case goes to court, 
unless the court is specifically asked to evaluate the merits of a par-
ticular dispute. it should determine only the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trator. Reference should not be made by courts to the merits of the cases 
in questions involving the determination of arbitrability. However, when 
there is an absence of a written agreeaent or when the arbitration clause 
excludes certain issues, arbitrators should attempt to uphold the "contract 
of settlement. 11 29 The basic problem, according to Mr. Justin, is the 
"conflict and confusion resulting from mixing up initially the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction on the one hand and his authority to decide the 
merits of the dispute on the other hand. 30 
Harold W. Davey substantially agreed with Mr. Justin's conclusions.31 
Although Mr. Davey disagreed on the relative iaportaace of arbitrability, 
he agreed on th.e functional responsibility of the arbitrator in this 
realm. Jurisdictional arguments tend to be weakened by the merits in-
volved within the case. Mr. Davey's solution to this perplexing problem 
was the separate analysis of arbitrability and the merits of the case. 
" He coacluded with this statement: Parties who are operating in good 
faith with a mature understanding. of the arbitration fl,tnction should 
28 lbid •• pp. 1-34. 
291bid., P• 5. 
301bid., P• 7. 
311bid., P• 40. 
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rarely disagree on arbitrability."32 
Review g!. Statistical Studies 
Many studies have been made .on the differing aspects of subcontracting. 
Most of the following studies indicate the degree and nature of the sub-
contracting. 
One study indicated that nine of 51 coapan~es under study had negoti-
ated with a union on .managerial subcontracting~JJ Representatives of 
eight of the nine firms indicated they desired a reduction in the degree 
of union penetration in this area. 34 
Another study has shown that contracts with non-manufacturing firms 
contained twice as many restrictions on subcontracting as those with firms 
whose principal function was manufacturing.35 
In 1956 the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor 
' 
made an analysis of 164 contracts in which subcontracting was specifi-
cally mentioned. In 12.2 percent of these cases .. subcontracting was 
prohibited when eaployees would be laid off. In the other 87.8 percent 
subcoutracting was couditionally permitted though employees would be laid 
off. These limits were as follows: the union had to be notified prior 
to the actual $ubcoatracting (9.8 percent); union permission was required 
(6.0 percent); subcontracted work must go to a contractor who observes 
32 Ibid., p. 40. 
33Milton Derber, W. Ellison Chaimers and Ross Stagner, "Collective 
Bargaining and Management Functions," Journal g!. Business, XXXI (April, 
1958), p. 109. 
34 Ibid., p. 111. 
35 Bureau of National Affairs, Labor lelations Reference Manual, 
DXXVI, P• 21. 
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uuion agreement (48.8 percent); subcontracting allowed only if necesaary 
facilities or employees are not available (10.4 percent); and other 
limitations (12.8 percent).36 
A study was made of contracts that covered 1000 or more employees 
in most industries except the airline and railroad industries. This 
study of contracts in effect in 1959 indicated that 77 . 6 percent of the 
cases studied made no reference to subcontracting. Of the 1687 agree-
ments studied four specifically prohibited any type of subcontracting. 
379 limited or made subcontracting conditional. and five agreements 
did not spaci.fy the nature of the restrictions (special cases).37 
When industrial agreements were examined in 1959. it was found that 
four industries (apparel and other finiahed products; petroleum. re-
fining and allied industries; utilities: electricity and gas; and con-
struction) had limitations upon subcontracting in over 50 percent of their 
agreements. Other industries which have a relatively high percentage of 
limitation on subcontracting in their agreements include: transportation. 
38 transportation equipment. and coaaunications. 
One study indicated that unionized companies studied subcontracted 
most of their co•struction and modernization vork--80 percent and 70 per-
cent, respectively. Further, about three-fourths contract out some minor 
construction--50 percent contract less than one-quarter of this construction 
36u. s. Bureau of Labor Statistic•, Monthly Labor Review, LXXIX (1956), 
P• 1388. 
37u. s . Bureau of Labor Statistics. Subcontracting Clauses ,!A Major 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, Bulletin Ho. 1304 (Waahington, 1960). 
p. 4. (Also see Appendix C for subcontracting limitations listed by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
38lbid. (Also see Appendix D for a listing of those unions which 
had two or more subcontracting grievances.) 
~ 
20 
work. Part of their maintenance work was contracted out by approxiaately 
80 percent of the firms studied. However, most of these contracted out 
less than 25 percent of such vort. 39 Other sources indicate that the 
gar .. nt industry also bas many restrictions on managerial autbority. 40 
It was determined by Chandler and Sayles that the factor of most 
importance in the decision to subcontract was cost (34 percent). However, 
past practice (26 percent), number of men on layoff (22 perceat), and 
union pressure (18 percent) were other de.terminants of this decision. 41 
Criteria~.!!. Determining~ Propriety Of Subcontracting 
Several authorities have suggested certain criteria for arbitrators 
to evaluate when determining the merits of a subcontracting case. The 
increase of arbitration proceedings in this area suggests that closer at-
tention should be given to these criteria.42 
Probably the most extensive survey of the standards for evaluating 
the propriety of subcontracting have been developed by the Elkouri's. 
They developed the following eleven criteria: 
Past practice; justification; effect on the union; effect 
of unit employees; type of work involved; availability of 
properly qualified employees; availability of equipment and 
facilities; regularity of subcontracting; duration of sub-
contracted work; unusual circumstances involved; history of 
negotiations on the right to subcontract.43 
3911argaret It. Chandler and Leonard R. Sayles, Contracting Q!!!: A 
Study .2!. Management Decision-Making, Columbia University, 1959), pp. 11-37. 
40John T. Dunlop and James J. Healy, Collective Bargaining (Homewood, 
1955), p. 485. 
41chandler and Sayles, pp. 11-37. 
42K. S. Ryder, "The Collective Bargaining lmpac t on Management Rights," 
Address ~ Industrial Relations, Bulletin No. 25, (1957) p. 7. Also, ''AAA 
Research Report," The Arbitration Journal, XII (1957), p. 134. 
43
rrank and Edna Elkouri, !!2!!. Arbitration Works, (Washington, 1960), 
pp. 343-345. 
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One arbitrator indicated that the propriety of subcontracting could 
be determined by examining some or all of the following criteria: 
Whether subcontracted work is to be performed continuously 
or only intermittently; whether it is to be perforaed perma-
nently or only temporarily; whether an emergency is involved; 
whether ~nit employees are qualified to do the work; whether 
eaploy9r .bas necessary equipment to do it; whether eaployer bas 
acted in good faith; whether subcontracting bas substantially 
harmful effect on union or members of bargaining unit; whether 
work is type which is frequently subcontracted in the industry; 
and whether it is type on which employer normally sustains loss 
or realizes unreasonably low profits.44 
Changes.!!!. £h!. Viewpoints .!:!.f Selected Arbitrators 
Many arbitrators have changed their viewpoint since 1945. In 1947 
arbitrator McCoy45 indicated "arbitrators are unanimous in holding that 
employers have the right to subcontract work unless such right is spe-
cifically restricted by contract."46 However in 1956 and 19.5947 McCoy 
recognized implied limits from the recognition, seniority and other 
clauses. These clauses implied subcontracting could make a nullify of 
the contract. Other arbit~ators such as Holly, 48 Klamon,49 Williaaa,50 
Wallen, 51 have also changed their views since their first subcontracting 
44Labor Arbitration Reports, XXV, p. 118, (Washington) , 
(Hereafter referred to as 25 LA 118.) 
45Arbitrator McCoy's award (12 IA 707) was cited 21 times by other 
arbitrators. See Appendix E for a listing of subcontracting awards which 
were cited more than 5 times. 
4612 IA 707. 
4727 LA 671, 33 LA 278. 
' 
4819 IA 815, 36 LA 695. 
4920 LA 690, 37 LA 834. 
5021 IA 330, 36 LA 714. 
5128 LA 491, 34 IA 420. 
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case. 
Some arbitrators have consistently recognized liaits to subcontracting. 
Arbitrator Wolff in 1950 indicated that some subcontracting could be ac-
ceptable, but "that neither party will unilaterally take any action which 
will nullify the contract." 52 
Some arbitrators have been unable to find a consistent trend among 
subcontracting awards. In 1958 Arbitrator Seward said: 
Beyond revealing that other companies and unions have faced 
this same question of implied obligations--have presented simi-
lar arguments and voiced similar fears--tbe cases show little 
uniformity of either tbeortical argument or ultimate decisions ••• 
Within each group of decisions, moreover, there are conflicts of 
principle and approach. The umpire bas returned from his ex-
ploration of the cases a sadder--if not a wiser--man, echoing 
the plaint of Omar IChayyam: 'Myself when young did eagerly 
frequent Doctor and Saint and beard great argument about it 
and about: 1but evermore came out by that same door where in I 
vent. 1 53 
Arbitrator Teple in a December, 1961, decision examined many recent 
decisions of other arbitrators. Re was reluctant to adopt the iaplied 
limitations on subcontracting even though many arbitrators bad. He indi-
cated: 
The right to subcontract is an important one, inherent in 
the basic function of managing the business, and its abandon-
ment must clearly be based on reasonably clear evidence.54 
Arbitrator Dash indicated that most arbitrators consider contracting-
out to be arbitrable even though the contract is silent on subcontracting. 
Further Dash found that in only nineteen of 64 cases did the company have 
the right to contract-out in the absence of contract provisions. In 45 
5114 LA 31. Arbitrator Wolff's award was cited twenty-two times by 
otner arbitrators. Most of these citations were in the years 1958-1962. 
5230 LA 678, 682. 
5337 LA 892, 898. 
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decisions the right to contract-out was not coapletely retained. 55 
Dash established patterns of liaitations based upon previous awards 
of arbitrators. The limits of good faith, economy and efficieacy, and 
past practice were most iaportant. Components of good faith (no in~ent 
to harm employees or union and no unreasonable, arbitrary or discr1ai-
natory actions) were next in importance. The third itea of iaportance 
that limited manageaent's right· to subcontract was the recognition, 
seniority, and other clauses. Any atteapt to violate the spirit, intent 
or purpose of the collective agreeaent was the fourth iaportant item. 
Dash also emphasized the importance of practices and relationships be-
tween the parties. 56 
Donald A. Crawford believed that there could be certain precepts 
developed froa the previous arbitrators' awards. He indicated that i•-
plied liaits were iaportant. The recognition and other clauses could be 
liaits to subcontracting. Re noted that this view was a minority viev:57 
Coapanies geaerally cannot subcontract to get lover wages. Contracting-
out regular plant operations and using noa-unit eaployees to replace 
bargaining unit employees are limited.58 Crawford iaplied that such 
issues as past practice, business decisions and, in certain cases iapli-
catioas of the contract clauses were not the real Justfications used to 
prevent subcontracting. He said: 
The doctrine seems to be that the coapany cannot under-
mine the status of the collective bargaining agent by 
contracting out work primarily to beaf the union prices, 
5533 LA 925, 943-944. 
56Ibid. 
57Bational Acadea,:y of Arbitrators, Challenges ~Arbitration (Pro-
ceedings of the Thirteenth ~nnual Meeting) (Washington, 1960), p. 68. 
58 Ibid., P• 69. 
.nor can the company coatract out pet'll&nent work without 
coapelling reasons other than a eeeaiag desire to reduce 
the status of the exclusive ageat.59 
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Frank and Edna Elkouri have al10 aade an extensive study of manage-
ment rights. Instead of attempting to delimit the underlying and poaai-
bly bidden factors that determine arbitrators' decisions, they accepted 
the more obvious explanations. They indicated that the recognition, 
seniority, and other clauses may liait management's right to subcontract. 
This is especially true in the absence of reasonable good faith-business 
decisions. 60 
In this chapter the thoughts of management, labor, and arbitrators 
have been examined. Only the arbitrators appear to have substantially 
changed their viewpoint in regard to managerial subcontracting rights. 
Kost arbitrators now recognize limitations froa the recognition, sen-
iority, and other implied clauses. Many studies show other standards by 
which to determine the propriety of subcontracting. In Chapter• IV and 
V these criteria will be analyzed. 
59 Ibid., p. 72. 
6
~rank and Edna Elkouri, p. 342. 
CHAPTER Ill 
ARBITRABILITY OF THE SUBCONTRACTING GRIEVANCE 
Difficulties have arisen in grievance arbitration because one party 
of the dispute {in almost all cases aanageaent) asserted that the grievance 
disregarded certain basic rights or functions. Generally management took 
the position that the decision to subcontract or not to subcontract was a 
management function, and that this decision was not subject to arbitration. 
Topics discussed in this chapter include federal and state court 
rulings before the Warrior !!!,!l Gulf decision; the Warrior !!!,!l ~ ruling 
of the United States Supreme Court; state and federal court rulings on 
su~contracting arbitrability after the Warrior !n.!!_ ~ decision; and de-
termination of subcontracting arbitrability by arbitrators. 
Court Decisions Before Warrior!!!!~ 
Arbitration of labor disputes has been the result of private labor-
management agreements. Many of the early common law decisions were not 
favorable to contractual arbitration clauses that involved voluntary sub-
mission-compulsory settlement agreements. And the statutes in most 
states were not conducive to the enforcement of these voluntary labor 
arbitration agreements. 
Today, New York has the most favorable state statute on labor arbi-
tration, but unfortunately many states still do not have statutes that 
promote and effectively enforce labor arbitration proceedings. Co11&on 
law, supplemented by some federal decisions, rather than statutes, rules 
25 
26 
in most of these states. 
Even the New York Supreme Court did not wholly uphold the implica-
tions of the New York statutes. The New York Supreme Court in the Cutler-
HaDDer ruling decided that 
If the meaning 9f the provision of the contract sought to 
be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to 
arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for 
arbitration.l 
This 1947 decision indicated that the court did not accept the broad 
meaning of the arbitration clause. This doctrine was quoted widely by 
many courts. It hindered to some extent the development of the complete 
federal policy on labor arbitration as outlined in the Labor-Management 
2 
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act. 
The question of whether it was permissable to have an agreement to 
arbitrate a future dispute remained in doubt until 1957. In 1957 the 
United States Supreme Court held that Section 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 allowed the court to fashion the 
necessary substantive law. 3 This decision (Lincoln Mills) allowed for 
the future enforcement of collective bargaining agreements which called 
for arbitration of unsettled grievances. The federal court '. made it ex-
plicit that arbitration was the procedure to settle grievance disputes 
which could not be settled otherwise. 
The courts have become involved in determining questions of 
1International Association of Machinists:!.~ Cutler Hammer, .1!!£.., 271 
app. Div., 917 (N. Y. ct. app.), 6 LA 1031 aff'd 7 LA 959), 1947. 
2 Specifically, Section 301. See Appendix •· 
3Textile Workers:!. Lincoln Mills .2!,Alabama, 353 u. s. 448, (40 
LRRM 2113), 1957. -: For · an extensive discussion of this and other cases, 
see Charles O. Gregory, Labor!!!!!,~~ (New York, 1961), pp. 443-
496. 
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arbitrability in sev~ral ways. The court may be asked for a "stay of 
arbitration"4 until the question of arbitrability has been decided. A 
party may "seek a court order compelling the other party to arbitrate,"5 
making it the duty of the court to decide the question of whether the 
dispute should be taken to arbitration. Another situation involving the 
courts occurs when an "award is taken to court for review or enforce-
An examination of the cases reported in the ~r Arbitration!!.· 
ports on subcontracting arbitrability presented to courts before the 
Supreme Court's Warrior~ Gulf decision in 1960 (discussed below) re-
7 
veals some interesting facts. 
!!!!. 12!!. Courts. All the cases in Nev York were decided by the Nev 
8 York Supreme Court and the Nev York Court of Appeals . 
Arbitrators were asked to determine the merits of the dispute in 
approximately 50 percent of these cases which the Rev York Courts de-
cided. Only one of the cases iavolved a contract which specifically 
9 limited management's right to subcontract. 
The cases declared arbitrable by the Nev York Courts were decided 
4 Prank and Edna Elkouri, p. 124. 
sibid. 
6Ibid . 
7 All of these cases are from the Labor Arbitration Reports, l•XXXVII, 
sub- titles 94.101, 94. 103, 94.117, and 94.166. Those cases that were en-
forced , appealed or reversed by higher courts were not considered. Reither 
were actions to recover damages, settle contract negotiations or in any 
way define or negotiate subcontracting. For a listing of the applicable 
cases ia the Labor Arbitration Reports for courts only see Appendix F. 
Also see Appendix G :t"or a listing of the awards not considered because 
of the above factors·.· 
8see Appendix F for a listing of these cases. 
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upon the basis of various criteria. Many mentioned that the acts or re-
lationships between the parties (Labor and Hanag ... nt) that had caused 
the dispute were within the meaning and application of the contract. The 
arbitration clause was the principal clause relied on to determine arbi-
trability. The recogaition and other clauses were rarely relied upon as 
the determining factor. Subcontracting that could be construed as making 
a nullity of the contract was given secondary importance. This claim had 
to be supplemented with other clauses of the contract to make a valid 
argument before the courts. 
In cases where the need for arbitration was !!.2! establisned, the 
merits of the grievances were used by the courts as a basis for finding 
that there existed insufficient reason for arbitration. Good faith-
. 
business decisions based on company practice (past practice) with no 
contractual limit on subcontracting were the main characteristics of these 
cases. Also, the finding that there was no dispute concerning the meaning 
and application of the contract was characteristic of several cases. The 
courts decided in the rest of the cases that since management had re-
tained its subcontracting prerogative, the arbitrators had no juris-
diction and there could be no restriction on subcontracting. 
Other State Courts. Courts in other states followed the general legal 
pattern of the New York Courts, but prior to the Warrior!!!!!, Gulf decisioa 
no cases in higher courts in other states were declared arbitrable. 10 
These courts decided there was no dispute concerning the meaning and appli-
cation of the contract because management bad retained its right to aanage 
the business (subcontract). In one case the arbitrator was not given 
jurisdiction because there bad been no voluntary submission of the issue 
lOsee Appendix F for a listing of these cases. 
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to the arbitration procedure. In all other cases the courts decided 
management could subcoatract where there were no explicit clauses limiting 
subcontracting in the contracts. 
Federal Courts. The federal courts were equally divided on the 
question of arbitrability. There were no specific contractual limits on 
management's right to subcontract in the cases decided by the federal 
courts.12 Courts rejected the recognition, job classification and other 
clauses as creating obligations to arbitrate. These courts relied 
principally upon the arbitration clause to send to the arbitrator cases 
which they felt involved a dispute over the relationships between the 
parties, or a dispute over the interpretation of the meaning and appli-
cation of the contract. 
Federal courts were reluctant to base their opinion on the merits 
of the grievances. However, when claims of arbitrability were rejected, 
the courts' supplemental support for the rejected claim included evidence 
based on the merit of the grievaace. This was always in support of evi-
dence that an arbitrator would not have jurisdiction, or that management 
had specifically retained its subcontracting rights. In certain cases 
the resistance of union pressure to limit subcontracting in the previous 
contract negotiations was proof of the retention of management's preroga-
tive. 
Warrior!!!.!!~ Decision 
Three years after the Lincoln Kills doctrine was established the 
United States Supreme Court was presented with three cases on 
1123 LA 302. 
l~ee Appendix F for a listing of these cases. 
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arbitrability. One of these, the case involving the United Steelworkers 
of America versus Warrior!!!.!!_ Gulf Navigation Coapany,13 dealt specifi-
cally with subcontracting arbitrability. The case involved a grievance 
filed by the union that questioned the right of management to lay off 
about one-half (nineteen of 42) of the employees in the bargaining unit 
and subcontract the work formerly done by these men. 
The company based its case on the fact that there were no prohibitions 
against subcontracting in the contract even though the union had attempted 
to limit subcontracting in past negotiations. Management ·felt that the manage-
ment rights clause which said, "matters which are strictly a function of 
14 management are reserved," protected management's action . in this case. 
Also, management pointed to past practice, economy and efficiency, and 
good faith to supplement its case. 
The union claimed that by contracting-out management had violated 
the contract. The union said that subcontracting had created a partial 
lo~kout, and further, that the action of management was not in good faith. 
The District Judge dismis.sed the motion to require the employer to 
arbitrate. He indicated in his decision that: 
The labor contract does not prohibit, and is not sus-
ceptible of being interpreted to require that defendant is 
prohibited from contracting out work.15 
The right to contract out work is an inherent, tra-
ditional right of management which may not be questioned 
or subjected to arbitration in the absence of agreement 
l3The Court was presented with three cases. United Steelworkers 2! 
America !. American Mfg. £2.., 80 S ct. 1343 '(1960); Steelworkers !. Warrior 
!!!.!!,Gulf, 80 s, ct. , 1347 (1960); and Steelworkers !.Enterprise Wheel and 
Car £2.:., 80 S. ct., 1358 (1960). 
1431 LA 712, 714-15. 
1531 LA 712, 714. 
on the part of the defend111t or an express limitation there-
of set forth in labor contract.16 
The union appealed to the United State& Court of Appeals (Fifth 
31 
Circuit, New Orleans). The majority report indicated that the coapany's 
contracting-out had not been "discriminatory, unjust or unreasonable. 11 17 
The union's claim of a partial lockout was termed a "simple play on words 
18 
and is insubstantial." The majority further indicated that: 
Whatever may be meant ordinarily by the term 'inherent 
rights of management' we clearly have here a matter which by 
the agreement of the parties is 'strictly a matter of manage-
ment . •19 
The minority indicated that the union's contention concerning the 
current situation of subcontracting did meet the requirements for grievance 
arbitration . The minority believed that the history of the relationships 
between the parties should not preclude the current grievance. 
The Steelworkers appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and in 
a decision delivered June 20, 1960, this Court ordered arbitration of the 
merits of the dispute.20 The Court, in its analysis of the three cases 
had to deal with the problem of the role of the judicial system in de-
termining arbitrability . The Cutler Hammer doctrine was rejected by the 
Supreme Cour t. In rejecting this doctrine the Court indicated that ordi-
nary contract law would not be applicable in this situation. !aphasia 
was given to industrial stability . Arbitration procedures in the ~ol-
lective bargaini ng agreements that lead to grievance settlement instead 
1631 IA 712 , 714-15. 
1744 LRRM 2567 , 2569. 
18Ibid . 
19Ibid . 
l036 LA 695. 
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of 'industrial unrest were considered to be the dominant public pol.icy. 
Therefore, the Supreae Court limited the function of courts, but in-
creased the stature of arbitrators in the determination of the aeaning 
of contractual language. The Court did this by indicating that, unless 
there!!!!. strong language £2_ the contrary,.!!! questions .2!!. whether £2_ 
21 
arbi~rate 2!. !!2l should]?!. resolved!!. favor of arbitration. 
The Supreme Court decision did not change certain aspect~ of arbi-
tration. Courts may still decide arbitrability; however the courts may 
not review the merits of the case.22 When the scope of the contract 
covers the dispute (even frivolous claims), then the court must allow 
the arbitrator to use his judgaent in the final determination of the dis• 
pute . The arbitrator is still limited to interpreting and applying the 
contract. 23 
Kot all authorities agree with the implications of the Supreme Court 
decision. Harold Davey indicated that many parties do not want arbi-
tration of this type . He said that the differing opinions on the 
24 functions of arbitrators should be considered. Others objected to the 
iaplications that arbitrators have more authority than that contained in 
25 
the arbitration agreeaent of the contract. 
2136. LA 695. 
221bid. 
23Ibid . 
24 licbard Martin Lyon, "Resistance to Grievance Arbitration," Person-
!!!, XXXIX, (March/April, 1962), pp. 40-41 ~. Quoting Harold Davey, "The 
Supre• Court and Arbitration : Musings of an Arbitrator," Notre~ 
Lawyer, (March, 1961) , pp . 138-145. 
25-ational Academy of Arbitrators, Arbitration!!!! Public Policy. 
(Proceedings of the fourteenth Annual Meeting (Washington, 1961), pp. 8, 
10. Also see Nev York University, Twelfth Annual Conference 2a Labor 
(•ev York, 1959) , pp . 211-226. 
Many agreed with the court decision. 26 Some like Archibald Cox 
prefer a liberal interpretation of the contractual language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Re said: 
It is not uaqualifiedly true that a collective bargaining 
agreement is siaply a document by which the union and employees 
have iaposed upon management limited, express restrictions of 
its other wise absolute right to manage .the enterprise, so that 
an employee's claim must fail unless be can point to a specific 
contract provision upon which the claim is founded.27 
Court Decisions after Warrior!!!!!_~ 
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All but one of the decisions on subcontracting by state and federal 
courts after the Warrior!!!!!.~ decision were decided in favor of arbi-
tration. The one decision declared the grievance was not arbitrable be-
cause it would "modify or amend" 28 the agreement. Modification or 
amendment of the contract was specifically forbidden in the arbitration 
clause. In the other cases the courts indicated that management does 
not completely retain its .. nagerial subcontracting prerogative. This 
is especially true when the arbitration clause indicates that all dis-
putes concerning the meaning and application of the contract are to be 
arbitrated. Some courts said that any dispute or conflict over any act 
or relationship between the parties is subject to the arbitration pro-
29 
cedure. One court based its decision entirely on the United States 
Supreme Court 's Warrior and~ decislon.30 In none of the above cases 
did the courts examine the merits of the dispute in determining the 
26Ibid., PP• 211-226. 
27Archibald Cox, "R.eflections upon Labor Arbitration," Harvard ~ 
Review, LXXII (March, 1959), p. 1116. 
2835 LA 168. 
2935 LA 255, 35 IA 703, 37 IA 389. 
J036 IA 998. 
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question of arbitrability. 
Deteraination of Subcoatracting Arbitrability ~Arbitrators31 
What ia the effect of subcontracting arbitrability decisions by 
arbitrators? What factors are iaportant in these decisions? The iapli-
cations of subcontracting arbit~ability deterainatioa by arbitrators will 
be examined in this sectioa. 
Determination of arbitrability is left to the arbitrator for several 
reasons. Usually the cost of an arbitrator is less than court pro-
32 
ceedings. Kost agreements provide that questions of interpreting the 
meaning and application of the contract shall be determined by an arbi-
trator. The arbitrator oftea determines arbitrability as part of ;his 
third party function. The implications of the arbitration, recognition, 
and other clauses33 are the bases for this decision.34 There is disagree-
ment among arbitrators over whether the merits of the dispute should be 
introduced before a ruling is made on arbitrability. One view is that 
arbitrability should be determined before the presentation of the aerits 
of the grievance . 35 The other view, held by only a ainority of arbitrators. 
31see footnote 7 of this chapter for limitations. Also see Appendix 
B for a listing of applicable cases in the Labor Arbitration Reports for 
arbitrators only. 
32rrank and Edna Elkouri, p. 120. 
33Job security is the criterion for the filing of grievances based 
on recognition, seniority, wage and other contract clauses. Eaployees' of 
a subcontractor replace bargaining unit employees. The union's status 
as the bargaining representative, the cumulative seniority of the dis-
placed eaployees, the aonetary renumeration from specific positions and 
the other benefits are!!! threatened by the contracting-out of work. 
34 
• .., York University, pp. 462-465. 
3522 IA 456, 460. 
is that arbitrability may be decided after the complete case has been 
heard.36 
An examination of nineteen cases from 1945 to 1962 in the Labor 
Arbitration Reports on subcontracting arbitrability shows that arbi-
trators rule almost unanimously in favor of a review of the merits of 
35 
the grievance. In only one case did an arbitrator rule otherwise. This 
involved a dispute in which the arbitrator ruled the contract specifi-
cally excluded his jurisdiction.37 The arbitrator further rejected the 
recognition and wage clauses as implied limits. He felt that the language 
of the atbitration clause precluded such clauses from limiting sub-
contracting. 
The one contract that had a contractual restriction limiting sub-
contracting was declared by the arbitrator to be arbitrable. 38 The arbi-
trator based his claim on the limitations involved in the scope clause. 
All the r ... ining cases (seventeen) were declared arbitrable even 
though there were no explicit contractual restrictions liaitiag sub-
contracting. These arbitrators based their decisions upon the interpre-
tation of the arbitration clauses. These clauses indicated that disputes 
over the meaning and applicatioa of the contract were arbitrable. Arbi-
trators in certain cases suppl~aented this claim by referring to the 
scope, seniority, recognition, ~ -other cla.uses of the contract. 
Merits of the dispute were introduced in a small minority of the cases. 
The history of negotiations between the parties, i.e., attempts to limit 
3619 LA 737, 738. 
37 22 LA 251. 
3812 LA 190. 
36 
subcontracting in previous negotiations; past settlements; iaplied recog-
nition of limits on subcontracting; and iaproper business decisions by 
the eaployer, were of importance in several cases. 
Most arbitrators did not introduce any merits of the grievance. In 
eighteen of the nineteen decisions, the arbitrator decided that the dis-
pute was arbitrable. The arbitrator was asked to determine th~ merits 
of the grievance in fourteen of these eighteen cases.39 In three cases 
arbitrability was the only issue, and in one case the arbitrator decided 
against further arbitration. 
The rulings of courts and a~bitrators were examined in this chapter. 
Before the Warrior!!!,!!, Gulf decision both federal and state courts ruled 
on questions of arbitrability~ ·. Only the arbitration clause was effectively 
used to find disputes arbitrable. Some of these rulings were based upon 
the merits of the dispute. The Supreme Court ruling in the Warrior!!!!, 
Gulf case prohibited state and federal courts from deciding these dis-
- . 
putes upon their merits. The court indicated that all questions over the 
meaning and application of the contract should be arbitrated. The only 
exception is specific contract language forbidding such arbitration . In 
cases pertaining to the arbitrability of the dispute, arbitrators have 
consistently decided the disputes were arbitrable; i.e., a determination 
should be made on the meaning and application of the contract. 
39see Appendix H for a listing of these cases. 
CBAPTBll IV 
All ANALYSIS OF SUBC<MTRACTING ARBITRATION CASIS CIASSIFIID BY TYPE OF WORK 
This has been an era during which most uni~ns have sought to broaden 
the area of collective bargaiad.ng. 1 This has caused unions to appeal to 
grievance arbitratioa issues which were negotiated, but not limited in 
previous contract negotiations. 2 Arbitration can be a device by which a 
union can seek to bring about limits on unilateral action by management. 
Has grievance arbitration lim~ted maaagerial authority? What has been 
the effect of arbitration decisions upon management's right, to sub-
contract? These are questions with ·vhich this chapter will be concerned. 
This chapter specifically involves the effect of arbitrators' decisions 
classified by type of work subcontracted. 
It would be almost iapossible to list completely the differing 
variables that are involved in grievance arbitration. However, the most 
iaportant variables are differences in: contract restrictions (aost 
contracts do not explicitly limit subcontracting), companies, unions, 
arbitrators, types of work, and individual grievances. Certain general 
determinants of subcontracting arbitration have developed from these 
differing variables. These determinaats become apparent when an analysis 
1Bat Goldfiager, "Are Tbere Limits to Collective Bargaining," 
American Federationists, LXV (December, 1958), p. 2. 
2samal Cook, "The llight to Manage," Labor !:!!t Journal, IX (March, 
1958), p. 197. 
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is made of the types of work involved in subcontracting arbitration. 3 
Cleaning !!2I!. 
There were 21 disputes concerned with the subcontracting of cleaaiag 
work performed on the company pr .. ises. The arbitrators decided in alaost 
50 percent of these cases that the employer bad violated the contract. 
Ten percent of these contracts had an explicit limit upon management's 
right to subcontract. In other cases, it was decided that management 
could not lay off its own janitors and subcontract the work because of 
these reasons: economy was not a sufficient justification; the employer 
would violate the job classification or the recognition clauses; and by 
such subcoatracting the contract could be nullified. In these cases the 
elimination of jobs by subcontractiag was not justified by past prac&ice, 
good faith, the marginal nature of the work, nor the absence of any 
showing of an intent to harm the union or the bargainiag unit. 
Additional reasons that did not uphold the employer's actioa were: 
not enough supervisors; consultation with the union prior to subcontractiag..; 
absence of ownership rights in the subcontractor; and absence of an agree-
ment not to subcontract though this bad been discused in prior contract 
negotiations . 
In the cases where the arbitrators found no violations of the contract 
there were no explicit limits on subcontracting. The main criteria for 
3 
•o importance should ~e given to the order in which the types of 
work are placed . See Appendix I for the 181 "rights" disputes on sub-
contracting arbitration classified by types of work. Those cases that 
were enforced, appealed or reversed by hiaher courts were not considered. 
Reither were actions to recover damages, settle contract negotiation.a or 
in any way define or negotiate subcontracting. These cases are all 
listed in the Labor Arbitration Reports under subtitles 2.137, 117.38, 
and 117.381 . 
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allowing subcontracting were economy and efficiency, and past practice. 
Contracting-out cleaning work that was the result of the creation of new 
jobs (no plant layoffs) was considered a reasonable business decision. 
In 1110re than half of these cases, wage, work, seniority, and recoaaition 
clauses were rejected by arbitrators as the bases for an award. In those 
cases where eaployees were laid off, insufficient employees, the teapo• 
rary (limited) marginal nature of the work, and industry practice were 
found to be sufficient reasons for subcontracting. In no case was there 
evidence of bad faith (intent to deprive union employees of work or ia-
tent to harm the bargaining unit). And if there had been an attempt to 
liait subcontracting in contract negotiations and the atteapt bad failed, 
then any subsequent contracting-out could not be construed as making a 
.. 
nullity of the contract. 
Guarding 
Many coapanies utilize specialized services of an outside contractor 
to guard the company property. Where this procedure bas been followed 
for aany years in the past, there generally is no disagreement as to 
management's right to follow this practice. But difficulties often arise 
when work is shifted from bargaining unit employees to an outside con• 
tractor. 
In each of the eight cases examined, the contracts contained little 
or no explicit limit on subcoatracting. Subcontracting was not justified 
in one case because of the abseace of any showing of economy, and the 
absence of any showing that present eaployees were unable to perform the 
job. In this case, because of the good faith of the employer, the 
damages were reduced.4 
422 LA 390. 
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Ia the other seven cases, good faith-business decisions were the 
predominant determinants. Although departaents were eliminated and ea-
ployees laid off, aanagement's actions were acceptable because of reason-
ableness, economy and efficieacy, and the nature of the special project. 
Of supplemental iaportaace were the!!!, miniais rule (affecting only one 
eaployee) and obsolete equipaent. Claias by the unioa of a violation of 
the recognition, seniority, and other clauses or an intent to hara the 
union were inadequate claims because of either the absence of contractual 
restrictions or the provisions of the management rights clause. 
Construction !.2!:!. 
Construction is noraally aajor work relative to the overall oper~ 
ation, for example, the installation of large machines or the building of 
new plant and equipment facilities. Construction may also involve minor 
maintenance in coajunctioa with the primary building and installatioa. 
Arbitrators found violations of the contracts in three of the 26 
construction cases brought to arbitration between 1945 and 1962. In 
two-thirds of these cases it was found that there was more than an im-
plied liait on aanageaent'a right to subcontract. Avoidance of the teraa 
and conditions of the contract, i. e. 1 recognition, seniority, and other 
clauses, was the basis for the arbitrators' awards . Prior awards, simi-
lar work, and availability of qualified eaployeea were other factors that 
iaflueaced the arbitrators . Past practice and an overload of work to be 
done wer• not applicable justifications for contractin~-out. 
In the other 23 of these cases no violations were found. Aa analy-
sis of these cases shows that leas than ten perceat had more than an ia-
plied liait on management's right to subcontract. There were no limits 
(explicit or iaplied) in approximately 60 percent of these cases. 
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Reasonable good faith-business deci1ions to preserve econoay and efficien-
cy su ... riz•• the aajority of awards. In addition, arbitrators u1ed 
components of good faith (no discriaination, no inteat to harm employ••• 
or the bargaiaiag unit and no monetary harm to employees) to indicate 
secoadary criteria. Much of the construction involved new jobs; tempo-
rary, emergency, one shot, or limited work; and/or work not nor.ally per-
formed by these employees. Arbitrators rejected the recognition, over-
time, seniority, and vork classification clauses as limits to construction 
subcontracting. If employees were working full time, employees and ma-
terials were not available, eaployees were not qualified, the union had 
been conaulted or was aware of past subcontracting, then layoffs of 
certain employees in order to aubcoatract were acceptable . 
Prior awards and employees on strike were of minor i mportance in de-
termining violations of the contract . Managements which successfully re-
sisted atteapts to limit ~ubcontracting during contract negotiations were 
held not to be avoiding the terms and conditions of the contract when 
they subcontracted during the follawing contract term. 
Cafeteria Operations 
Four cases involved the subcontracting of cafeteria operations . Rone 
of the cases analyzed had an a~aolute contractual limit on management's 
subcontracting right, but in tvo· cases there was an implied limit. These 
implied limits were found in the scope clause and other terms or conditions 
of the contract . Limits were also placed on unilateral actions of manage-
ment that might make a nullity of the contract. Consideration was given 
to the fact that this work would be performed on the plant premises. 
Limits were applied even though in certain instances no workers would be 
laid off i .. ediately. 
In the other two decisions, subcontracting was allowed to con• 
tinue. Major factors behind the allowance of work placed outside the 
bargaining unit were economy and efficiency and reasonable good faith 
business decisions. Good faith (not discriminatory or arbitrary), no 
violation of the recognition and work classification clauses, and past 
practice and .. rginal work (not major work), were of supplemental im-
portance in the allowance of contracting-out. 
Maintenance Work 
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Maintenance is minor installation and repair of equipment and plant 
facilities. Innovations often require adjustments in the parts of manu-
facturing equipaent. Maintenance, like construction, may involve building. 
However, maintenance is minor rather than major work. Some of the mainte-
nance of a large industrial firm is of a predictive nature; i.e., 
schedules of future aaintenaace work can be determined by an analysis of 
previous maintenance schedules, type and age and number of equipment, 
e~ . 
In six of the 47 maintenance cases the employer was found to have 
violated the contract. In one-half of the violations there was no ex-
plicit prohibition against subcontracting in the contract. The elimina-
tion of jobs from the bargaining unit and the poseible nullification of 
the contract by such action were the major cause of violation awards. 
In certain cases, econoay, past practice, reasonable business practices, 
or aaintenance of managerial prerogatives were rejected ae defenses of 
subcontracting. In other cases availability of employees and equipment, 
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tbe contract date, and local working conditions were the basic detenai-
nants of contract violations. Grievances were upbeld in cases where 
tbere was little or no injury to the employees, where there had been no 
objections from the union on previous subcontracting, and when the ea-
ployees had threatened to strike. The recognition clause was used ef-
fectively to substantiate the union claims. 
In the other 41 maintenance cases, the arbitratorsdecided there was 
no violation of the contract. In one-eighth of these contracts there 
was a limit, in one-quarter a minute limit;, and the other cases no ex-
plicit contractual limit on management's subcontracting powers. 
Past or prevailing practice was cited by arbitrators as the major 
deciding factor. Other factors in order to importance were economy and 
efficiency; good faith; reasonable action; temporary, special, marginal, 
emergency or limited work. In a majority of these cases there were no 
plant layoffs. Because the employees of the firm were not available or 
~ 
were fully employed, the decisions to subcontract were upheld. Com-
ponents of good faith (justification, no intent to hana employees or the 
bargaiaiag unit) and business decision were not as important as other 
criteria. In some cases recognition, se~iority, job classification, scope, 
overtime, and wage clause~ were rejected by arbitrators as explicit liaits 
on maintenance subcontracting. Local working conditions were rejected 
when management had subcontracted in the past without union objection. 
Also obsolete equipment or no qualified employees or supervisors were ade-
quate defenses. 
When the company had no ownership rights in the subcontractor and 
there was a management rights clause, contracting-out was not limited. 
However, the absenc• of a management rights clause did not bar future 
subcontracting. Work performed on the plant premises was acceptable even 
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during a strike when the union had failed to get limit• on subcoatractiog 
ia previous negotiatioas. Previous awards were of minor importance. 
Printing Labels 
The subcontracting of printing labels removes from the employees the 
process of inscribing information on boxes, wrappers, and tags. There 
were two such cases, and the employer was found not to have violated the 
contract in either case. In neither of the contracts involved were there 
• 
explicit limits on the employer's right to subcontract. The scope, sen-
iority, or recognition clauses did not restrict the good faith-business 
decisions of the employers to subcontract. Past practices, prior awards, 
the .. rgiaal nature of the work, economy and efficiency were considered 
to be reasonable suppport for the employers' contentions. There were at-
tempts to limit subcontracting in prior negotiations, but these attempts 
failed. Therefore, layoffs in these cases were found not to be an 
avoidance of the terms and conditions of the contracts. 
Major Plant Operatioas 
Major plant operations refers to work directly related to the oper-
ation of the plant. An example would be a department which contributes 
directly to the integrated manufacturing process. A majority of the cases 
in this category were of this type. A few cases involved processes 
supplemental to a department, e.g., the testing process in a research 
and development department. 
In twelve of these 34 cases, the arbitrator found that .anagement 
violated the contract by contracting-out work. Many of these cont~acta 
specifically limited management's right to subcontract, but a violation 
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was found in one-fourth of the contracts where there was no . prohibition 
against contracting-out vork. When employ••• were laid off aanagement 
was declared guilty of making a nullity of the contract, because the aub-
contracted work was similar work, qualified eaployeea and equipment vere 
available, and the work was ptrformed on the plant premises. Further, 
such work would avoid the terms of the recognition, seniority, wage, 
overtime, work, and other clauses of the contract. The contracts were 
declared to be violated even though the eaployer had not agreed to limits 
in previous negotiations, had subcontracted in the past, had an overload 
of vork that needed to be finished or did not have ownership rights in 
the subcontractor. Economy and efficiency and limited (marginal) 
contracting-out were rejected as defenses by the arbitrators. 
In twenty-two of these cases, the arbitrator found no contract vio-
lation. , In one-half of these cases the collective bargaiaia.g agreement 
did not limit management's subcontracting rights. In these cases the 
past practice of contracting-out work was the major factor. Good faith-
business decisions baaed on econoay and efficiency were other major cri-
teria. Ron-discriminatory decisions based upon special (limited) 
contracting-out because of emergencies or other similar critera were ac-
ceptable justifications. Even though the work had been performed on the 
premises management did not violate the overtime, wage, lockout, sen-
iority, and other clauses of the contract. 
When additional work was needed to be done and the necessary equip-
ment or employees vere not available, subcontracting was acceptable. If 
the union had not objected to past subcontracting and/or bad been notified 
of pending contracting-out, or if management had negotiations, then such 
actions by management were reasonable. Th• absence of a manageaent rights 
clause did not prevent management from contracting-out. 
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Scrap Operations 
There were five cases involving scrap operations. lxaaination of 
the one contract violated by the eaployer sbows that there was a limit 
on subcontracting. Tbis limit was for the maintenance of local working 
coudltioas. ··· This probibition against subcontractjng was guaranteed even 
though the present employees were apparently not qualified. The good 
faith desire of the employer to achieve economy through subcontracting 
was held to be not sufficient justification. 
In the other four cases, there was no violation of the contract by 
the eaployer. In these cases past practice and the increased efficieacy 
and economy that could be derived from subcontra.cting were allowable 
justifications. Good faith-business decisions with little or no con-
tractual limits for this.•pecial (marginal) work were further justifi-
cations. Even though worker~ were laid off, the recognition and sen-
iority clauses were not justifications to limit the action of the employers. 
Power 
The subcontracting for a supply of electrical power was involved in 
two cases. In neither case was there a violation of the contract by the 
employer. There was little or no liait on subcontracting in the contracts. 
la one case employees were laid off. The defense of the employer was good 
faith. Further, the employer noted that the union had not objected to past 
practice. The work was classified as a special project, 1. e., not normal 
work. 
The other case involved subcontracting when the employees were ob-
serving picket lines of another union. In this emergency the sub-
contracting temporarily of power house work was held to be justifiable. 
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No iaplied restrictions were involved to preclude the purchase of out• 
si~e power. The arbitrator indicated a further examination of the situ-
ation would be necessary if the purchase continued after the picket lines 
were removed. 
Sales !.ru!. Distribution 
What is the effect of eliminating the sales and distribution function 
froa bargaining unit employees? There were two grievances concerning the 
sales and distr~bution function which went to arbitration. In neither 
case was there any explicit contractual liait on the right to subcontract. 
The arbitrators decided that there had not been violations of either of 
the contracts. These actions by the employers were termed good faith-
business decisions. Further, in both cases emphasis was given to the re-
tention of tbe managerial prerogative. That the company had no ownership 
in the subcontractor and past subcontracting of part of the distribution 
operations were additional proper claims. 
Transpgrtation 
Transportation, as a type of work, includes jobs from removing ashes 
to messeng~r service--operating public transportation to aoving the fa-
cilities of an accounting department. Most of these jobs involve special 
projects, extra runs, or marginal work. 
During the years 1945 to 1962, there were a total of tventy-sevea 
cases involving transportation. It was found that the employer violated 
the contract in seven of these cases. In alaost 30 percent of the vio-
lations, there were specific limits on management's right to remove the 
jobs froa the bargaiaing unit . There was no predominant issue which 
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established ·the union's clai ... The unioas based their claias on .. inte-
nance of take-hoae pay, job classifications, recognition, wage, and other 
clauses; the Railway Labor Act; and prior awards. The layoffs in certain 
cases were termed an avoidance of the contracts that could, if continued, 
make a nullity of the agreement. Individual claims of past practice, 
good faith-business deciaions were not allowable claias. 
In twenty cases the arbitrator found no violation of the contract. 
In all of these cases there was little or no explicit limit on sub-
contracting. The elimination of jobs or layoffs of employees was reason-
able because of past practice, economy and efficiency, and the teaparary 
" 
or aarginal nature of the work. In almost all awards the arbitrator 
mentioned that the action was a business decision taken in good faith 
without a deliberate intent to hara the -eaplo,ees or the bargaining unit. 
Rejected were claims by the union that recognition, seniority, wage, job 
classification, and scope clauses had been violated. These rejections 
were based on the de minimis rule, action by management that was not arbi-
trary or discriminatory, and the management rights clause. If an unsuc-
cessful attempt had been made during previous contract negotiations to 
limit subcontracting, or if the union was aware of past contracting-out 
then the contract was not violated when management acted. In certain 
other cases if the union was consulted according to the rules of the 
contract then the employer could contract out even over the union's ob-
jection. Minor iaportaace was given to obsolete equipment, work not 
noraally performed by the employees and prior awards. 
Can former employees become independent contractors and perform sub-
stantially the same functions? If the employer initiates the plan for 
the eaployees to become independent contractors then generally they cannot. 
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But arbitrator• are divided in their opinions if employees initiate the 
plan. In one case the plaa, though in good faith, vas beld not reason-
able because the work was performed on the company premises and therefore 
violated the recognition clause. In the other case the plan was accept-
able when there was good faith, no intent to deprive work from the em-
ployees or to hara the union, and the eaployees voluntarily wanted such 
an arrangement. In both of these cases there was no explicit contractual 
limits on subcontracting of the messenger service. 
Clerical~ 
In both of these cases it was found that employer• did not violate 
their contracts when clerical work such as collection and addressing jobs 
were subcontracted. There were little or no limits in the contracts on 
subcontracting of such work. Although in certain inatances eaployees 
were laid off, there were no violations because the actions were found 
to be good faith-business decisions. Since there appeared to be no de• 
liberate intent to harm the union and the work was off the premises, the 
employers were found to have the right to continue aubcontracting. 
In summary, there were twelve classifications of work that were in-
volved in grievance subcontracting • . An analysia of Table 4.1 reveals 
that the subcontr~cting grievances were composed of these types of work: 
maintenance (25.97 percent); major plant operation• (18.79 percent); 
transportation (14.92 percent); construction (14.37 percent); cleaniag 
(11.60 percent); and all others (14.35 percent). 
There were violations of the contracts in 23.20 percent of the 181 
grievances. In cleaning work (47.62 percent) and in major plant oper-
ations (35.29 percent), arbitrators found the contract to be violated 
more than any other type of work. Contracts involving types of work 
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which could be performed by subcontractors off the plant premises were 
seldom found to be violated. 
TABLE 4.1 
TYPES OF WORK SUBCONTRACTED 
(Classified by contracts violated and not violated) 
No violated contract Violated Codtract Total 
Type · of Work Cases I Pere.eat Ca.au l Percent CasesjPercent -
-" 
-
Maintenance 41 87.23 6 12. 77 47 25.97 
Major Plant 
Operations 22 64. 71 12 35.29 34 18.79 
Transportation 20 74.07 7 25.93 27 14.92 
Cons true tion 23 88.46 3 11.54 26 14.37 
Cleaning 11 52.38 10 47.62 21 11.60 
Guarding 7 87.50 l 12.50 8 4.42 
Scrap Operations 4 80.00 1 20.00 5 2.76 
Cafeteria Operations 2 50.00 2 50.00 4 2.21 
Printing Labels 3 100.00 0 00.00 3 1.66 
Clerical 2 100.00 0 00.00 2 1.10 
Power 2 100.00 0 00.00 2 1.10 
Sales and Distribution ~ 100.00 _Q 00.00 ~ 1.10 
TOTAL 139 76.80 42 23.20 181 100.00 
The major determinants of arbitrators' decisions classified by type of 
work were examined in this chapter. A more detailed analysis of these de-
terminants on the basis of time periods will be developed in Chapter V. 
CHAPTIRV 
SUBCONTRACTING--TIME PERIOD ANALYSIS 
Arbitrability 2£. Subcontracting Grievances .!?J. !!!!!. Period 
For purposes of analysis, the cases on arbitrability may be broken 
down into six time periods as follows: Time period I covers from Sep-
tember, 1945, to August, 1947, and involves cases found in Volumes I 
through 37 of the Labor Arbitration Reports; time period II is froa 
1 August, 1947, to February, 1950, found in Volumes 8 through 13; time 
period III includes Volumes 14 through 19 (March, 1950, to February, 
1953); time period IV includes Volumes 20 through 25 (March, 1953, to 
February, 1956); tiae period V includes Volumes 26 through 31 (March, 
1956, to February, 1959); and time period VI includes Voluaes 32 through 
37 (March, 1959, to March, 1962). Only cases decided by arbitrators 
will be analyzed in this chapter. 
As Table 5.1 indicates period VI included twelve (63.15 percent) of 
the nineteen cases on arbitrability. Period V had two (10.53 percent); 
period IV, three (15.79 percent); and period II, tvo (10.53 percent). 
Periods I and III had no cases on arbitrability. Up to period VI arbi-
trators placed emphasis on the arbitration clause and other supporting 
evidence in their determination of arbitrability. The meaning and 
1The Labor Arbitration Reports are published weekly. Therefore, 
one time period or volume aay stop, and another time period or volume 
may begin in the same month. 
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application of the contract became important in period V. In period VI 
this was the greatest single determinant of arbitrability. 
TABLE 5.1 
ARBITRABILITY OF SUBCONTRACTING GRIEVANCES BY TIME PERIODS 
Time Period 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
Years 
1945-1947 
1947-1950 
1950-1953 
1953-1956 
1956-1959 
1959-1962 
Labor Arbitration 
lleeorts 
Volumes l - 7 
Volumes 8 - 13 
Volumes 14 - 19 
Volumes 20 - 25 
Volumes 26 - 31 
Volumes 32 - 37 
Number g! 
Cases 
0 
2 
0 
3 
2 
12 
Percent 2! 
19 Cases 
0 
10.53 
0 
15.79 
10.53 
63.15 
Many new criteria were introduced in period VI. The most important 
of these was the recognition clause and its limit upon the managerial 
subcontracting prerogative. While two-thirds of the arbitrability cases 
were in this time period, three-fourths of the limits from the recognition 
clause and all (100 percent) of the limits on management rights from the 
seniority, scope and other clauses were in period VI. Increases in the 
use of the merits of the grievances were a characteristic of period VI. 
Individual arbitrators also reflect this trend. There were two arbi-
trators who had more than one case concerning the arbitrability of sub-
contracting. 2 Arbitrator Crawford had two cases in period VI. In both 
cases he indicated that even though there were no specific prohibitions 
against subcontracting, the grievances were arbitrable because of the 
recognition or other clauses. Arbitrator Ryder had two cases--one in 
3 period IV and one in period VI. Neither contract prohibited subcontracting . 
233 LA 228, 37 LA 544. 
322 LA 251, 36 LA 912 . 
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However, in period IV no limit on subcontracting was implied from either 
the recognition or wage clause. In period VI the recognition and 
bargaining unit provisions of the contract made the subcontracting arbi-
trable. , Therefore, implied limits from the recogDition and other clauses 
have become recognized as determinants of arbitrability. This trend be-
came well established in period VI. 
Arbitrators and courts generally agree on the determinants of arbi-
trability. Since the Warrior!!!!, Gulf decision, courts have relied upon 
the arbitration clause to make any dispute over the meaning and applica-
tion of the contract arbitrable. This has restricted unilateral sub-
contracting by management. Arbitrators have put more emphasis on the 
recognition, seniority and scope clauses of the contracts tq determine if 
there should be an interpretation of the contract. 
~Analysis 2£. Subcontracting Arbitration Cases Classified~ I!!!!. Period 
Several determinants of subcontracting arbitration have been noted. 
What is indicated by a time period analysis of these determinants? Can 
a trend be established from the criteria noted under the types of work? 
The same time period analysis as the one developed above will be used to 
deal with these questions. 
As Table 5.2 indicates, time period I had six (3.31 percent) grievances 
over subcontracting which vent to arbitration. Period II had fifteen (8.29 
percent) grievances; period III, thirteen (7.18 percent); period IV, 27 
(14.92 percent); period V, 43 (23.76 percent); and period ' VI had 77 (42.54 
percent) grievances. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show a steady increase in the number of sub-
contracting grievances that were taken to arbitration. The lack of awards 
upholding union grievances was reversed in period III. Since period Ill 
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the percentage of contracts found to have been violated has remained within 
the 20 to 30 percent range. 
TABLE 5, 2 
SUBCONTRACTING ARBITRATION GRIEVANCES BY TIME PERIOD 
Time Period 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
Years 
1945-1947 
1947-1950 
1950-1953 
1953-1956 
1956-1959 
1959-1962 
Labor Arbitration 
Reeorts 
Volumes l - 7 
Volumes 8 - 13 
Volumes 14 - 19 
Volumes 20 - 25 
Volumes 26 - 31 
Volumes 32 - 37 
TABLE 5.3 
Number of 
Cases 
6 
15 
13 
27 
43 
77 
Percent of 
181 Cases 
3.31 
8.29 
7.18 
14.92 
23.76 
42.54 
NUMBER OF SUBCOHTRACTDIG GRIEVABCES BY TIME PERIOD 
{Classified by number of violations and non-violations of contracts) 
It ... I II 
Period 
Ill I 1' V ,1 Total 
Total grievances 6 15 13 27 43 77 181 
Violations of 
contract found 0 l 6 8 9 18 43 
No violation of 
contract found 6 14 7 19 34 59 139 
TABLE 5.4 
PERCENTAGE OF SUBCOKTRACTING GRIEVANCES BY TIME PERIOD 
{Classified by number of violations and non-violations of the contracts) 
Period 
Item I II III I IV V VI Total 
~ grievances 3.31 8.29 7.18 14.92 23.76 42.54 100.001. 
Violations of 
contract found 0.00 6.67 46.15 29.63 20.93 23.38 23.20 
No violations of 
contract found 100.00 93.33 53.85 70.37 79.07 76.62 76.80 
Contractual limits!?!. subcontracting. Table 5.5 shows that 47 percent 
of the findings of violations of contracts which restricted subcontracting 
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occurred in period VI. Findings of violations of these contracts which 
restricted subcontracting were ~ot common in the earlier periGds. Period 
I through III had almost nineteen percent (Table 5.4) of the 181 sub-
contracting grievances that were taken to arbitration, but approximately 
25 percent (Table 5.5) of all cases in which the disputes were not upheld 
despite contractual limitations were in these periods. 
TABLE 5.5 
ARBITRATORS ' FIND IRGS OF VIOLATIONS OF CONTRACTS CONTAINING'RESTRICTIONS 
ON SUBCONTRACTING 
(Percentages by Time Periods) 
Period 
Item I II III I IV V VI Total 
Contractual iimita-
tions on sub-
contracting 5 10 10 10 21 44 1001 
Violations of 
contract found 0 6 17 12 18 47 100'1 
No violation of 
contract found 7 11 7 9 23 43 100'1 
When contracts which had no contract provisions speclfically re-
stricting subcontracting are examined, the same . pattern exists. In period 
I and II arbitrators did not upbold any grievances 'wh~ there were no pro-
hibitions against subcontracting. But the lack of a restriction in the 
contract upon subcontracting did not prevent arbitrators from upholding 
grievances by unions in periods III through VI (Table 5.7). 
TABLE 5. 6 
SPECIFIC GOOD FAITH JUSTIFICATIONS IR SUBCONTRACTING GRIEVANCES 
(Percentages by Time Period) 
l1 Period Item I II Ill I IV y YI Total D 
Good Faith 
(Specifically cited) 5 5 2 18 34 36 100'1 
Good faith but vio-
lation of contract 0 0 0 20 39 41 1001 
Good faith and no vio-
lations of contract 5 6 3 18 33 35 100'1 
TABLE 5.7 
PERCENTAGI LIMITS BY TIMI PERIOD OIi SUBCONTBACTIIIG 
Item 
!2. contractual limits 
2!. subcontracting 
Violations of 
con.tract found 
No violation of 
contract found 
!2_ intent· £.2. ~--
Ix 
0 
0 
0 
Bargaining unit 0 
Employees 12 
Reasonable action 
Bcoaomy .!!!.!!, 
Efficiency 
Violation of 
contract found 
lfo violation of 
contract found 
Temporary-Marginal 
~ 
Seniority Clause 
Violation of 
contract found 
No violation of 
contract found 
Other clauses 
Violation of 
contract found 
Bo violation of 
contract found 
~ nullity of 
contract 
Business decisions 
Violation of 
contract found 
No violation of 
contract found 
0 
3 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
11 
0 
5 
0 
5 
II 
11 
0 
13 
5 
19 
6 
5 
0 
6 
5 
5 
0 
7 
13 
0 
34 
0 
5 
0 
6 
Period 
III I IV 
5 18 
12 
4 
0 
0 
6 
5 
10 
4 
2 
6 
0 
8 
9 
8 
0 
14 
6 
5 
6 
24 
16 
5 
25 
7 
12 
10 
12 
10 
6 
24 
0 
14 
23 
0 
16 
8 
3 
8 
V 
26 
24 
27 
14 
31 
45 
21 
10 
23 
27 
11 
0 
14 
27 
23 
33 
8 
31 
10 
33 
40 
40 
40 
76 
13 
36 
54 
70 
51 
54 
72 
76 
71 
32 
46 
22 
62 
45 
82 
42 
56 
Total. 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
1001 
51 
~ Faith. Good faith was used as a proper justification for sub-
contracting iD all periods. As Table 5.6 shows, there were no contracts 
found to be violated because of an absence of good faith iD periods I 
through 111. In periods IV through VI many contracts were held to be 
violated even though there was evidence of good faith. The implied limits 
of good faith and its components became more important to subcontracting 
cases in the later periods. Eighty-eight percent (Table 5.6) of the ac-
ceptable justifications of good faith were in periods IV through VI, 
while only about 81 percent (Table 5.4) of the subcontracting grievances 
taken to arbitration were in this period. There were specific claims of 
good faith as a subcontracting justification in more than one-third of the 
181 grievances. 
"Bo deliberate intent to deprive employees of work" declined in rela-
tive importance during periods V and VI. However "no intent to hara the 
status of the bargaining unit" became •ore importaat in arbitrators' awards 
(Table 5.7). More than three-fourths of the uses of this criterion 
(bargaining unit) were in period VI. "Reasonable actions" that were 
neither arbitrary nor discriminator~ have not increased in importance as 
major criteria. The claim of reasonableness supported by evidence bas how-
ever become one of the main "supporting" criteria used by arbit,rators. 
' 
Eighty-one . percent (Table 5. 7) of .. these supporting evidence claims were 
made in periods V and VI. 
l!..!£, Practice. Past, prevailing, company or industry practice of sub-
con~racting barJaining unit work if supported by other evidence was justi-
. 
fiable action. So•e type of specific "practice" claim was made in more 
than one-half of the 181 grievances. Less than ten percent of these 
"practice" justifications were rejected. As Table 5. 6 indicates, more 
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than 60 percent of the rejections of "practice" justifications were ia 
period VI. Kore than three-fourths of the past practice justification• 
were in periods V and VI. 
TABLE 5.8 
PEllCEMTAGE OF PAST PRACTICE CLAIMS IN SUBCONTRACTING GlllBVAMCIS 
(By Time Period) 
l·I: 
Peri2ci 
VI I I tea II Ill I IV V Total 
l!!£. eractice claiu 2 7 6 9 24 52 100'1 
Past practice but 
violation of 
contract 0 9 12 0 19 60 100'1 
Past practice and 
no violation of 
contract 2 7 5 10 25 51 100'1 
Economy and Efficiency. Specific claims of econoay and efficiency 
were made in more than 45 percent of the 181 cases. In cases where the 
arbitrator found no violation of the contract, "economy and efficiency" 
was one of the major criteria. However, 70 percent (Table 5.7) of the re-
jections of e~onomy and efficiency as crite~ion were in period VI. These 
rejections occurred on the grounds that management could not replace 
bargaining unit workers with non-bargaining unit w~rkers solely because 
the new workers were willing to accept reduced wages. 
Temporary-Marginal~. Temporary-marginal work is short duration 
work. It also involves o~ly a few members of the bargaining unit. 
Special projects, one-shot, and limited emergency work may be involved. 
This type of subcontracting arbitration case has become very important 
in recent periods . While only 66 percent (Table 5.4) of the subcontracting 
cases were in time periods V and VI, 81 percent (Table 5.7) of the 
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temporary-marginal work cases were in these tvo periods. 
!2!.!, Performed .2.!!. !h!_ Premises. Most of the objections to sub-
contracting are based on preaises work. When outside employees take over 
the work of cleaning, cafeteria operations, major plant operations and 
other similar work, arbitrators have a greater tendency to grant the 
grievance. No discernable trend developed between the first and last 
periods •. 
Recognition--Seniority !!!! Other Clauses. Many arbitrators have 
indicated that management's recognition (recognition clause) of the union 
as the bargaining agent for the bargaining unit employees carried implied 
limits against unilateral acts such as subcontracting. Table 5.9 indi-
cates that in periods I and II there were no claims of violations of the 
recognition clauses. Most of the violations of the contract were in 
period VI (57 percent). Seventy-three percent of the rejected claims of 
TABLE 5.9 
PERCENTAGE RECOGJIITION CLAUSE VIOLATION CLAIMS BY TIME PERIOD 
I I Period I tea II Ill I IV V VI Total 
lleco15nition cbause 
cited 0 0 6 6 21 67 1001 
Violation of 
contract found 0 0 7 15 21 57 1001 
No violation of 
contract found 0 0 6 0 21 73 1001 
contract violations because of the recognition clause were in period VI. 
This represents a reversal of the pattern that had been established in 
the previous tables. This pattern had been that violations of the contract 
from implied limitations were greater in percentage importance Jn period 
VI than the percentage importance of subcontracting justifications (no 
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violations of the contract) in period VI. 
What are the underlyiag factors of this reversal? First, the Warrior 
!!!!. 2.!!,!t decision of the U. s. Supreme Court in 1960 determined that any 
dispute over the interpretation and application of the contract makes the 
dispute arbitrable unless specific evidence can be shown that the parties 
intended such matters to be non-arbitrable. Second, claims of a violation 
of the recognition clause make most disputes arbitrable. Third, after es-
tablishing the arbitrability of the grievance through the recognition 
clause, many grieving parties attempt to establish the merits of the dis-
pute by claiming violations of the recognition and other contract clauses. 
Some arbitrators, while accepting the recognition clause as a basis 
foranarbitrable dispute, have ·been reluctant to rely on the recognition 
clause as the 11ajor determinant which violates the contract. Implied 
limits from the recognition clauses are now accepted by most arbitrators. 
However, the recognition clause combined with other merits of the dis-
pute is now the most popular method of limiting managerial subcontracting. 
Approximately the same trend is found for the seniority clause. One 
hundred percent of the violations found on the basis of the seniority 
clause are in periods IV through VI, and 76 percent (Table 5.7) of the 
violations were in period VI. The use of the recognition, seniority or 
other clauses that explicitly limit managerial action as a basis for finding 
a contract violation was practically non-existent in the first two periods. 
I 
Other clauses such as the overtime, wage, work and job classification, 
scope, lockout, and arbitration clause reflect similar limitations and 
trends. Over 90 percent (Table 5.7) of the total violations from these 
clauses were in the second half (periods IV through VI). Arbitrators indi-
cated that by unilaterally contracting-out work management could make a 
nullity of the contract. More than fifty percent (Table 5.7) of these 
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"nullity" restriction• were in period VI. Further, almost 90 percent of 
these restriction• vere in periods IV through VI. ly the implications 
involved in the above criteria, arbitrators indicated • that management had 
avoided the terms and conditioas of the contract. Seventy-five percent 
of these "avoidance" restrictions were in period VI. 
Business Decisions--Management Prerogative . Management's prerogative 
to unilaterally subcontract work has been limited . Good faith-business de-
cisions as a justification for subcontracting have been reduced in im-
portance. Less than 40 percent (Table 5.7) of the cases based on the 
ttacceptable business decisions" criterion were in period VI. Period VI 
also contained most of the rejections (90 percent) of "business decisions" 
as a defense. 
Consulting~ Union. When the union was consulted according to the 
contract, then subcontracting was acceptable even over union objections. 
If the union was aware of past subcontracting, then generally complaints 
against subcontracting were ineffective. If management has successfully 
avoided restrictions on contracting-out in previous contract negotiations, 
then subsequent contracting-out was acceptable. However, in periods V 
and VI several arbitrators indicated that such negotiations carried im-
plied limitations on management's right to subcontract. 
Other Relevant Criteria. Layoffs of bargaining unit employees by 
management have had a tendency to become more acceptable to arbitrators 
if management can present evidence of the need for these layoffs. If the 
employees were not qualified, available, or working full time, then there 
were generally no violations of the contracts. There were generally no 
violations of the contracts if equipaent and materials were not available 
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and of the kind necessary to coaplete the work. Management must, however, 
attempt in good faith to supply the necessary material and equipment. 
Employees on strike did not cause a limitation of subcontracting. 4 
Local practice or working conditions did limit management's sub-
contracting prerogative. This was true most often in periods V and VI. 
There was no change in the status of former eaployees becoming inde-
pendent contractors. As noted before (pages 48•49 of this thesis) action 
must be initiated by the employees, and there must not be an intent to 
harm either the eaployee's status or monetary positions of the bargaining 
unit or its members. Management cannot have ownership rights in a sub-
contractor. 
The Warrior and Gulf decision and the Railway Labor Act have been 
declared by some arbitrators as limits to subcontracting. Other limits 
on subcontracting not frequently used are: the date of the contract, and 
whether the work is aajor or minor in nature. The lack of a management 
rights clause does not limit management's prerogative to subcontract. A 
strongly-worded management rights clause can affirm this subcontracting 
prerogative. 
Definite trends have been established in this chapter. Iaplied 
limits from most of the above criteria have become real limits on manage-
ment's right to subcontract. Period VI, contrasted with most of the 
earlier periods, seems to show a definite trend to,rard greater utiliza-
tion by arbitrators of iaplied limitations. 
423 LA 603, 34 LA 763, 36 LA 510. 
CBAP'l'IR. VI 
SUMW.RY AID CORCWS ION 
What bas been the effect of arbitrators' decisions in subcontracting 
cases upon manag .. ent rights? Management's right to subcontract bas been 
limited by arbitrators' recognition of implied limitations. A review of 
arbitrators' awards and other literature since 1945 shows that arbitrators 
have recognized limitations froa many contract clauses. Management's and 
labor's views on implied limitations did not change. Labor does favor 
and management does not favor further utilization of implied limitations 
upon managerial subcontracting action. 
The United States Supreme Court in 1957 (Lincoln Mills) and 1960 
(Warrior !!!,g_ ~) made decisions which gave emphasis to the public policy 
implications of industrial stability. in the Labor-Kauagement Relations 
(Taft-Hartley) Act. Section 301 was interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
allowing for voluntary submission-compulsory settlement through arbi-
tration of grievances. 
The Warrior!!!!!. Gulf decision made questions concerning the merits 
of grievances strictly a matter to be determined by arbitrators. Courts 
1'!- can still determine arbitrability, but the Supreae Court has indicated 
that unless there is strong evidence to the contrary all questions of 
whether to arbitrate or not must be decided ia favor o.f arbitration. 
After the Warrior and Gulf decision arbitrators have in the cases studied 
consistently recognized that the implications of the recognition, sen-
iority, arbitration and other clauses make subcontractiag disputes 
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arbitrable. Thia ia true even in the absence of specific contractual 
limitation• on aubcontractiag. 
Bach aubcontractiag grievaace ia differeat. The grievance, coa-
tractual restrictions, coapaniea, unions, arbitrators, types of work and · 
determinants of the arbitrators' awards are never the same. However 
there are certain general characteristics that are similar in each case. 
The 181 subcontracting grievances were analyzed by types of work. 
Arbitrators found that .. ny of the contracts involviag on-the-preaises 
work were violated (cleaning, major plant operatio~s, and cafeteria oper-
ations). Contracts involving work which could be performed off the 
premises or work which was closely related to exclusive .. nagerial 
functions were generally not found to be violated when arbitrators ex-
amined the merits of the disputes. 
When subcontractiag arbitrability decisions by arbitrators were 
analyzed by time period, it was found that twelve of the nineteen sub-
contractiag arbitrability cases were in time period VI. Only 25 percent 
of the recognition clause limitations were in periods I through V. 
There were no limitations from the seniority and other clauses (ex-
cluding the arbitration clause) in these first five periods. About 37 
percent of the subcontracting arbitrability cases were in the first five 
periods. Therefore, in period VI limits on subcoatracting from pre-
viously minor criteria (recogaition, seniority, and other clauses ex-
cept the arbitration clause) becaae iaportaat. 
Individual arbitrators also reflect this trend. Most arbitrators, 
who in earlier periods indicated that subcontracting was an inherent right 
of management, recogaized implied liaitatioaa upon management in sub-
contracting arbitrability cases in later periods. It appears that the 
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Supreae Court's Warrior!!!!!,~ decisioa was considerably responsible 
for the iacreased recogaitioa of iaplied liaitationa ia period VI. 
The time period analysis of the 181 subcoatracting grievance• taken 
to arbitration shows that 77 (42.54 percent) were in period VI. This 
represents a steady increase. siace the six grievaaces (3.31 percent) in 
period I. 
There were _several aon-contractual limitations upon managerial sub-
contracting. The most iaportaat of these specific claims were: practices 
(past, prevailing, company or industry); economy and efficiency; good 
1 
faith; temporary or aa,giaal nature of the work and business decisions. 
Other criteria of mi~or or suppleaental importance were: availability of 
equipment, materi•l• or qualified eaployees; whether the union bad been 
consulted; whether employees were on strike; ownership of the subcon-
tractor;.!!!, miniais rule; and prior awards. Work that was perforaed on 
the premises was an iaportant deterainant in certain types of operatioas. 
Contractual restrictions upon subcontracting were effectively used to 
limit subcontracting in most -periods. When there were no specific re-
strictions in the contract probibitiag s~bcontracting, contracting-out 
was still limited. This was e-,.cially true of the later periods, e.g., 
88 percent of these violations were lu periods IV through VI. 
One of the most important developments in subcontracting arbitration 
baa been the use of recognition and other clauses as limitations to mana-
gerial subcontracting. Since the Warrior~ Gulf decision, arbitrators 
have been besieged with union attempts to establish the merits of the 
disputes by claiaing violatioas of the recogaition and other contract 
1 Good faith or one of its coaponeats (intent to hara eaployeea or 
the bargaiaing unit, reasonable actions, no arbitrary or discriminatory 
acts, etc.) was a criterion ia almost all of the 181 cases. 
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clauses. About 67 percent of the claims of violations of the recognition 
clause and 72 percent of the claims based-on the- seniority clauseil were 
in period VI. Arbitrators found implied limitations from these clauses. 
The recognition or other clauses of the contract combined with the merits 
of the dispute became in period VI the most popular method of limiting 
subcontr,acting. 
The cases studied seem to indicate that arbitrators, reinforced by 
the Supreme Court's decision in the Warrior and~!! case, have in-
creasingly tended to decide in favor o~ the arbitrability of subcontracting, 
and to find implied limitations on subcontracting in many types of contract 
clauses. It appears that a principal effect of these decisions has been 
a further limitation on management's right to subcontract. 
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APPBIDIX A 
A MANAGEMENT RIGHTS CLAUSI IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COITRACT1 
The management of the plant, the .determination of all matters of 
management policy and plant operation, the direction of the working force, 
including without limiting the rights .to hire, discipline, suspend or dis-
charge, promote, demote, transfer or lay off employees, or to reduce or 
increase the size of the working force are within the sole prerogatives 
of the Company, provided; however, that they will not be used in violation 
of any specific provieions of this agreement. The Company shall' be the 
exclusive judge of all matters pertaining to the products that it manu-
factures, the location of its plante, the methods, processes and means of 
manufacturing, the schedules and standards of production, methods, pro-
cesses, means, and materials to be used, and except as specifically pro-
hibited in this Agreeaent. The Company shall have the right to continue 
and maintain its business and produ~tive operations as in the past, and 
it is understood that except as expressly limited in this Agreeaent, the 
Coapany shall have all the customary righte and functions of management, 
and its judgae1:1t in these re,spects shall not be subject to challenge. 
lllanageaent Rights!!!!!_ !!!!_Arbitration Process, 
•inth Annual Meeting National Acadeay of Arbitrators, 
of Rational Affairs, 1956). p. 132. 
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APPIDUB 
SBCTIOI 301, A AIO> B OF THE TAFT-BAITLIY ACT 
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees, in an industry affecting co111111erce 
as defined in this act, or between any such labor organization, 1118.Y be 
brought in any district court of the United States have jurisdiction of 
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without re-
gard to the citizenship of the parties. 
(b) Any labor organization, which represents employees in an industry 
affecting cOllllllerce as defined in this act and any employer whose activi-
ties affect collllllerce as defined in this Act, shall be bound by the acts 
of its agents. Any such labor or,anization may sue or ~e sued as an 
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts 
of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization 
in .a District Court of the United States shall be enforceable only 
against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual 
member of his assets. 
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APPINDIX C 
ESSENCE OF SILECTED COLLECTIVI BARGADIING COIITRACT PROVISIONSl · 
(Unioii ' au"d Manag'ement Functions, ·Rights and ,Responsibilities) 
Contracting!.!!!_ Subcontracting 
Company retains right to subcontract. 
Prohibition of contracting. 
Prohibition of inside or outside contracting . 
No home work. 
Numerical liaitation on amount of contracting. 
Contracting limited to certain types of work. 
Mutual consent for contracting of work regularly done by employees 
in bargaining unit. 
Consultation with union when occasion for contracting occurs: 
management retains final decision. 
Advance notice to union; union objection submitted to grievance 
procedure. 
Company to discuss contracting with union and agree on satisfactory 
disposition of demotion or lay-off resulting from contracting . 
No discrimination against union members in contracting. 
Contract work to be returned to plane as soon as efficient facili-
- ties are available. 
Conditions under which contracting!!. permitted: !!!!!. us~.g! space, 
equipment,!.!!!_ workers. 
No contracting as long as machinery and equipment available. 
Management right to contract without union interference provided 
preaent permanent employees do not lose ·normal work. 
No contracting which results in lost time to present regular 
employees, excluding emergency or unusual work. 
Restrictions on subcontracting: All employees must be on full time 
and none laid off, subcontractor must be covered by agreement . 
No contracting which results in discharge or lay-off of employees 
customarily doin& work. 
Outside contracting not to result in lay-off or discharge of employ-
ees. 
Contracting outside certain locality prohibited for some eaployers 
under association agreement: permitted others, provided agree-
ment covers subcontractor. 
1u. s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin !2.• 1!£, (Washington: 
U.S. G~vernment Printing Office, 1949), 21-24. 
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APPE1'DIX C (Continued) 
Contractors relations!.!!!!. union. 
Union contractors oaly--same union. 
Union contractors only--same union and similar agreement terms. 
Union contractors only--not restricted to same union. 
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Union contractors must have signed agreement and must be registered 
with union. 
Company right to contract work without regard to union membership 
or affiliation of contractors employees. 
No contracting to firm struck or picketed by union party to the 
agreement. 
Union to furnish substitute contractor in event of labor dispute 
with contractor. 
Maintenance 2£. agree .. nt !!!.!!. wage standard. 
Contractor to maintain conditions provided in agreement. 
Ro contracting to avoid contract wage scales; no new subcontracts 
during period of lay-off. 
Contractor to pay prevailing wages and hours but not less than 
minimum job rates set by agreement. Definition of work to which 
contracting restrictions apply. 
No contracting of work customarily done unless more economic and 
expeditious and contractor conforms to agreement. For other out-
side work, company will request contractor to pay agreement rates. 
Employer responsible for wages owed by contractor. 
Employer r•sponsible for compliance with agreement by contractor. 
Buaber of 
grie1rances 
25 
24 
14 
9 
9 
7 
7 
6 
6 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
APPEIID IX D 
UNIONS WHICH HAD 'lWO OR. MORE SUBCOITRACTING GRIEVANCES l 
United Steelworkers of •America 
International Aasociation of Machinists 
United Automobile. Aircraft and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America 
Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America 
Oil Workers International Union 
United Mine Workers of America 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
Textile Workers Union of America 
International Union of United Brewing, Flour. Cereal and 
Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America 
United Papermakers and Papervorkers of America 
United Electrical, R.adio and Machine Workers of America 
Transport Workers Union of AMrica 
International Chemical Workers Union 
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America 
Aaarican Newspaper Guild 
lnter11ational Union of Operating Engineers 
International Union of Electrical R.adio and Machine Workers 
Amalgamed Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor 
Coach Baployees of America 
United Stone and Allied Products Workers of America 
American Federation of Grain Millers 
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America 
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America 
Coaaunication Workers of America 
United Packinghouse Workers of Ame~ica (Food and Allied 
Workers) 
l.rhia Appendix lists only those unions which had two or more of the 
181 ·subcontracting grievances studied. The grievances came from Volumes 
1 through 37 of the Labor Arbitration Reports. 
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APPENDIX E 
CA~.ES WHICH ARBITRATORS CITED MORE THAii FlVE TIMES 
Times cited Times cited 
14 LA 31 22 1.7 LA 790 8 
12 LA 707 21 7 IA 474 7 
24 LA 158 16 21 LA 330 7 
21 LA 267 15 29 IA 67 7 
15 IA 111 13 30 IA 678 7 
24 IA 33 13 30 IA 1066 7 
21 LA 713 12 11 IA 197 6 
24 IA 821 11 24 I.A 883 6 
8 IA 990 10 26 IA 870 6 
16 i,A'' 644 10 28 I.A 491 6 
25 LA 118 10 32 LA 786 6 
7 IA 748 9 19 LA 815 5 
19 LA 503 9 25 I.A 1 5 
24 LA 121 9 27 LA 671 5 
13 IA 991 8 30 LA 449 5 
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A PPBlfD IX. P 
CASI LISTUGS BY COURTS WHICH DITERNDID 4U1TRAB1LITY OF SUBCORTRACT11'Gl 
9 LA 1045 
12 IA 290 
22 LA 586 
23 LA 168 
23 LA 302 
23 IA 413 
27 IA 440 
29 IA 551 
30 LA 849 
30 LA 851 
32 IA 269 
32 LA 326 
32 IA 587 
32 LA 587 
3~ LA 986··· 
33 IA 127 
33 IA· 352 
34 IA 106 
34 LA 233 
34 LA 380 
34 LA 552 
34 LA 561 
34 LA 652 
34 IA 716 
35 LA 168 
35 LA ' 255 
35 LA 703 
36 LA 998 
37 LA 389 
Nev York Supreme Court 
New York Supreme Court 
Nev York Supreme Court 
New Jersey Superior Court 
Oregon Circuit Court 
Nev York Supreme Court 
Nev York Supreme Court 
New York Court of Appeals 
U.S. District Court (Michigan) 
U. s. District Court (Massachusetts) 
lew York Supreae Court 
Connecticut Superior Court 
Nev York Supreme Court 
New York Supreme Court 
New York -eourt of Appeals 
U.S. Court of Appeals (Denver) 
lew York Supreme Court 
U. s. Court of Appeals (Chicago) 
Nev York Supreme Court 
u. s. District Court (Pennsylvania) 
New York Supreae Court 
U.S. Supreme Court 
New York Supra .. Court 
Mew York Supreae Court 
U •· S. District Court (Borth Dakota) 
Tenaessee Court of Appeals 
u. s. Court of Appeals (Philadelphia) 
U. s. District Court (Rew York) 
Connecticut Supreae of Errors 
March 14, 1948 
March 2, 1949 
June 17, 1954 
August 24, 1954 
September 24, 1954 
Rovember 11, 1954 
November 9, 1956 
April 4, 1957 
February 20, 1958 
April 30, 1958 
April 3, 1959 
February 12, 1959 
April 27, 1959 
May 13, 1959 
July 8, 1959 
September 8, 1959 
November 4, 1959 
March 2, 1960 
March 28, 1960 
March 22, 1960 
May 19, 1960 
June 20, 1960 
June 20, 1960 
June 13, 1960 
September 12, 1960 
September 8, 1960 
December 20, 1960 
June 20, 1961 
October 10, 1961 
1All these cases were taken from the Labor Arbitration Reports, 
Volumes 1 through 37 (1945-1962). Those cases that were enforced, ap-
pealed or reversed by higher courts were not considered. Neither were 
actions to recover damages, settle contract negotiations or in any way 
define or negotiate subcontracting. 
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APPENDIX G 
CASE LISTINGS OF SUBCONTRACTING DECISIONS NOT USED FOR REASONS LISTED 
Contract negotiations Enforcement, appeal 2!. revetsal ~ courts 
5 I.A 71 
6 I.A 470 
11 LA 337 
11 LA 1023 
14 I.A 408 
18 LA 112 
33 LA 451 
!2, decision-negotiate grievance 
2!l subcontracting arbitration 
13 I.A 652 
17 LA 790 
26 LA 74 
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Damages 
22 LA 108 
25 IA 585 
26 I.A 677 
26 LA 835 
31 LA 628 
31 IA 712 
32 LA 943 
32 LA 944 
37 LA 199 
37 LA 499 
37 LA 843 
8 LA 1001 
36 LA 61 
36 IA 1364 
:APPENDIX H 
CASE LISTINGS AND ARBITRATORS WHO DETERMINED AiRBITRABILITY OF SUBCONTRACTING 
12 LA 190 Plott, H. H. 
13 LA 652 Capelo£, M. 
21 IA 267 Larson, L. V. 
22 LA 251 Ryder, M. S. 
25 IA 546 Board {Cahn, s. L.' T. L. Burke, H~ 
E. Holman) 
26 LA 74 Mar~~all, P. G. 
29 IA 67 Sembower, J. F. 
32 LA 366 Schedler, c. R. 
32 LA 815 Anrod, C. w. 
33 LA 228 Crawford, D. A. 
33 LA 925 Dash, G. A., Jr. 
34 LA 215 Teple, E. R. 
34 LA 420 Wallen, s. 
36 LA 695 Holly, J • F • 
36 LA 714 Williams, R. R. 
36 LA 912 Ryder, M. s. 
37 LA 544 Crawford, D. A. 
37 LA 685 Young, G. H. 
37 LA 944 White, D. J. 
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APPENDIX I 
SUBCCIITRA.CTDG AUITRATION BY TYPBS OF woRKl 
2 LA 254 
- M 20 LA 690 - co 27 LA 704 - T 
2 LA 569 
- T 21 LA 267 - PO 28 LA 158 - M 
6 LA 855 
- PO 21 IA 330 - T 28 LA 270 - C 
7 Ll 133 
- PO 21 LA 713 - PO 28 LA 461 - co 
7 LA 474 
- M 22 IA 68 ~-l'O 28 LA 491 - PL 
7 LA 748 - G 22 LA 124 - T 28 LA 559 - PL 
8 LA 91 
- PO 22 LA 266 - G 28 LA 737 - co 
8 LA 465 - M 22 LA 390 - G 28 LA 865 - T 
8 LA 966 
- T 22 LA 484 - PO 29 LA 67 - C 
8 LA 990 
- PO 22 LA 608 - M 29 LA 555 - T 
10 LA 396 
- T 2, LA 171 - PO 29 LA 594 - C 
10 IA 842 
- M 23 LA 400 - PO 29 LA 609 - co 
11 LA 197 
- G 23 LA 603 - PO 29 LA 824 - M 
11 LA 291 
- T 24 LA 728 - T 30 IA 21 - SD 
11 IA 419 
- M 24 LA 33 - PO 30 LA 26 - M 
12 LA 190 
- PO 24 LA 121 - PO 30 LA 379 - co 
12 LA 707 - co 24 LA 158 - M 30 LA 449 - C 
13 LA 189 
- M 24 LA 821 - C 30 LA 493 - SD 
13 LA 399 
- M 24 LA 882 - C 30 LA 678 - so 
13 LA 690 
- PO 25 LA 1 - T 30 LA 714 - M 
13 LA 991 - co 25 IA 118 - C 30 LA 827 - M 
14 LA 10 
- PO 25 LA 151 - T 30 LA 893 - PO 
14 LA 31 
- CA 25 LA 281 - C 30 LA 998 - CA 
14 LA 645 
- M 25 LA 327 --' PO 30 LA 1053 - T 
15 LA 111 
- C 26 IA 79 - PO 30 LA 1066 - M 
16 LA 89 
- PO 26 LA 438 - PL 31 LA 482 - M 
16 LA 644 
- C 26 LA 568 - co 31 LA 607 - p 
16 LA 829 
- M 26 LA 723 - T 31 LA 623 - K 
16 LA 887 
- T 26 LA 870 - C 31 LA 646 - co 
17 LA 493 
- PO 27 LA 57 - M 31 LA 880 - M 
19 LA 219 
- PO 27 LA 111 - co 32 LA 68 - t 
19 LA 503 
- PO 27 LA 174 • . M 32 LA 131 • 'M 
19 Ll 815 
- M 27 LA 233 - M " 32 LA 351 - M ~ 
19 LA 882 
- PO 27 LA 413 - M 32 LA 366 - co 
20 LA 60 
- M 27 LA 423 - M 32 LA 464 • T 
20 LA 227 
- co 27 LA 530 - co 32 U. 781 
- T 
20 LA 432 • PO 27 LA 671 
- PO 32 LA 799* - 2-SO, 3-CO, M 
lAll these cases were taken froa the Labor Arbitration Reports, Volumes 
1 through 37 (1945-1962). Those cases that were enforced, appealed or re-
versed by higher courts were not considered. Reither were actions to re-
cover damages, settle contract negotiations or in any way define or negotiate 
subcontracting. 
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APPENDIX I (Continued) 
32 IA 815 
- G 34 IA 763 - p 36 IA 1173 - T 
32 LA 965 
- M 34 LA 883 - M 36 LA 1304 - T 
33 LA 51 - T 35 U. 330 - co 36 LA 1341 - PO 
33 IA 177 
- M 35 LA 397 - C 36 IA 1396 - T 
33 IA 209 - CL 35 IA 403 - M 36 IA 1447 - CO 
33 LA 228 - T 35 IA 415 - co 37 LA 252 - C 
33 LA 278 
- T 36 IA 106 - T 37 LA 334 - T 
33 LA 282 - co 36 IA 118 - C 37 LA 342 - co 
33 LA 852* - 2-M 36 LA 137 - PO 37 IA 366 - M 
33 LA 874 - co 36 IA 320 - co 37 LA 442 - PO 
33 LA 893 
- G 36 LA 409 - G 37 LA 506 - M 
33 IA 965 - G 36 LA 510 - co 37 IA 544 - T 
33 IA 972 
- C 36 IA 631 - C 37 LA 599 - co 
34 LA 200 - M 36 I.A 677 - CL 37 IA 685 - C 
34 LA 215 
- C 36 LA 714 - M 37 LA 784 - so 
34 LA 394 
- T 36 IA 787 - PO 37 IA 834 - PO 
34 IA 420 
- CA 36 LA 861 - so 37 IA 867 - M 
34 IA 455 
- M 36 IA 871 - PO 37 IA 892 - CA 
34 LA 554 - co 36 IA 912 - M 37 LA 944 - C 
34 LA 661 - M- 36 LA 1079 - PO 37 LA 984 - M 
34 LA 665 
- PO 36 IA 1147 - C 
Code: 
CA Cafeteria Operations PO Major Plant Operations 
C Cleaning p Power 
CL Clerical PL Printing Labels 
co Construction SD Sales and Distribution 
G Guarding so Scrap Operations 
M Maintenance T Transportation 
* Indicates those case listings which have more than one grievance on 
subcontracting. 
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